As I foresaw, John Mearsheimer’s essay on ‘Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault’ in the September-October issue of Foreign Affairs magazine stirred up the hornet’s nest of  those in and around the magazine’s editorial board who were responsible for the policy disaster on Russia/Ukraine that Mearsheimer took apart analytically in his essay. The hullaballoo in the Friends of State camp was so considerable that the pushback that often follows publication of controversial essays in FA in the following edition was not  a five or six page Response, as is normally the case, but was instead allotted a whopping 12 pages under the heading “Faulty Powers. Who Started the Ukraine Crisis?” in the just released November-December issue.

Mearsheimer is a scholar’s scholar, a theorist who has not served in the government. He is also not a Russianist. His area of expertise is in the realm of IR theory where he has carved out a niche in neo-Realism.  FA in its wisdom set against him two professors who have followed a more widely practiced route of outstanding political scientists, having worked within U.S. diplomacy in the home office as planners and in the field as implementers. They both are heavily invested in the policies at issue:  Michael McFaul, who in 2012-14 was U.S. Ambassador to Russia and for 3 years before that was a close adviser to President Obama on Russian affairs; and Stephan Sestanovich, who was Ambassador-at-Large to the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union in the period 1997-2001. 

And yet, in this seemingly unequal battle, Mearsheimer held his own very nicely, parrying the intended blows of his heavier class opponents and landing a Technical Knock-Out by merely standing in the ring when the final bell sounded.

Let me say straightaway that this was generally a high minded and decent fight such as, sadly, has become a rarity in our day of the information war, when brawlers on behalf of the Establishment are all too ready to denounce naysayers as stooges of Putin. McFaul’s labeling the Realpolitik analysis of Mearsheimer as potentially ‘irrational and dangerous’ was suggestive but little more than a wild swing. And there was a hint of ad hominem argumentation brought in by Sestanovich via his allegation that Mearsheimer has done flip-flops in his views on the Cold War and relations with Russia, citing works from Mearsheimer going back to 1990 and 1993.  Reversals there may well be, but that proves nothing, least of all in the sphere of analysis of current events, where political scientists are regularly asked to project future scenarios based on facts that are constantly changing. In this context, consistency of positions taken is no virtue and inconsistency is no vice.

Mearsheimer in his response to his critics effectively turns back the misrepresentations of his arguments. Sestanovich did it explicitly, McFaul did it implicitly:  both took for a given that Mearsheimer’s case rested on the argument that NATO expansion alone was what drove the resentment and rising assertiveness that led Russia to ‘annex’ Crimea and set up the present East-West confrontation in a Ukrainian civil war.

McFaul stresses that in his five years in government he never heard NATO expansion come up as an issue from the Russian side. It became so only after the December 2011 mass demonstrations against the Putin regime following the egregious irregularities of Duma elections. According to McFaul, at that point Putin needed to invent a meddling enemy in the person of the USA to justify his repression at home, and NATO expansion was a leading point in the anti-American campaign that goes on till this day. As McFaul puts his argument succinctly:  “Russian foreign policy did not grow more aggressive in response to U.S. policies; it changed as a result of Russian internal political dynamics.” Moreover, in claiming that Putin’s actions were driven by his own’ ideology,’ McFaul tries to turn the tables on Mearsheimer over who, the United States or Russian leadership, is blinded by ideology.

 After repeating verbatim the Washington Consensus narrative of the events leading up to the overthrow of the Yanukovich government in February 2014 and the heating up of confrontation with Russia, Sestanovich focuses his attention on the NATO issue, asserting that this could not have been the real driver of events either in the period prior to the overthrow of Yanukovich or in the time since. He tells us that:

 ‘Yanukovich’s fall was a historic event, but it did not, despite Russian claims, revive Ukraine’s candidacy for NATO membership. Ukrainian politicians and officials said again and again that this issue was not on the agenda.”

Central as this question may be to his critique of Mearsheimer, in setting out as his own the official Washington history of events Sestanovich makes many parallel criticisms of the Realist approach that Mearsheimer embodies. Whereas in his original article Mearsheimer would have us believe that Putin is a master strategist and Realpolitik player, Sestanovich endeavors to prove that the Russian president is impulsive, irrational and ultimately a loser.

His additional line of attack is that neither party to the confrontation, that is, neither the United States nor Russia, has been consistent in following a Liberal policy line or a Realpolitik policy line respectively. America has preached universal values (Liberalism) but practiced Realism (old-fashioned power politics) in pursuit of national interests.

In what is, finally, a much more dense and complex analysis than McFaul’s, Sestanovich leaves us with the vision of a Russian President bent on conquest who is kept in check only by the expansion and reinvigoration of NATO which dates from the time of his service in the State Department.

Mearsheimer uses his time in the ring to overturn what he considers misrepresentation of his argumentation in the September-October issue. He insists that NATO expansion was only one of his three ‘critical elements’ but that on this one Sestanovich and McFaul are dead wrong: contrary to their assurances, the United States both before the Georgian War in August 2008 and afterwards pushed actively for Ukraine in NATO while knowing full well Russia’s determined opposition to such an outcome. The second element that directly caused the crisis as stated in Mearsheime’s September essay was the February  22, 2014 coup that ‘ignited the fire.’ Here Mearsheimer challenges directly and persuasively the narrative from Sestanovich alleging that Yanukovich inexplicably fled and was subsequently impeached. Finally, he disputes the notion of both his opponents that Russian foreign policy has been determined by the personality of Putin rather than by clearly defined national interest.

Mearsheimer concludes with a prediction that Vladimir Putin will emerge from the present confrontation having achieved his primary aim: “preventing Ukraine from becoming a Western bulwark.”

Given the difference in weight categories of the contestants, the fact that Mearsheimer remained on his feet at the end of the match may be explained as much by the sheer flabbiness of his opponents as by the strength of his argumentation. So many points introduced by Sestanovich and McFaul were simply unbelievable.  McFaul’s repeated insistence that Russia never objected to NATO expansion during his time in government service suggests either mendacity or amnesia. The entire thrust of Russian foreign policy during the Medvedev presidency was precisely to rein in NATO and prevent its waging war on Russia as it had done on Serbia through the drafting of a new security architecture for Europe.  Sestanovich’s suggestion that Yanukovich abandoned his presidential office of his own free will is not worthy of serious discussion even if Mearsheimer deigned to respond.

What I am saying is not incidental, it is fundamental to the entire boxing match.  The Establishment boys are long out of practice at debates. In their contemptuous dismissal of any opponents who present another vision of events, one which in any way seems to defend the Russian narrative, they have unlearned the art of one-on-one combat.  They appear in auditoriums, they appear in print only before their own kind. They do not take their thoughts to conclusion, because they know they will be understood and approved at mid-sentence.

Considering the experiential strength of his opponents, it would surely have helped his cause, and made him seem less of an outlier if Mearsheimer had reminded his readers that there are some very serious Russianists and practitioners of diplomacy in the Russian area who fully share his understanding of causality and of how events unfolded in the US-Russian confrontation over NATO and over Ukraine.  To name two, these are Professor Stephen Cohen of NYU and Princeton and Ambassador Jack Matlock. Authority does not win arguments by itself, but it also does not hurt to have authority on one’s side.

I propose to conclude this critique of the response and counter-response by looking at the tantalizing issue which Sestanovich and McFaul raise, but which neither they nor Mearsheimer deal with exhaustively or profoundly. This is why since Putin’s accession to power up until the present deep crisis Russian policy towards the United States in particular and the West in general has alternated between gestures of rapprochement and ever more serious confrontation.

But taken in full context, they are not gestures but something more substantial that might be better understood as a Plan A (alliance with the US) and a Plan B (proceeding the Russian way building partnerships against the USA).  I maintain that Plan A has always been the preferred policy of the Kremlin under Vladimir Putin’s stewardship, but a full-blown Plan B has been at the ready and has been advanced and implemented when and where Plan A has come up against insuperable obstacles not of Russia’s making.

If we go back to the days immediately after 9/11, we find that Vladimir Putin was the first head of state not merely to reach out to George Bush with words of consolation but to follow that with amazing concessions to US security interests, especially in Russia’s own back yard, Central Asia, enabling America to organize its riposte to the Taliban in Afghanistan.  This was understood at the time and has since been seen by many specialists as a direct bid to enter into a close security partnership with the United States. Put in other terms it was a bid to enter NATO.

However, Russian membership in NATO in 2001, just as in 1994, the last time it was seriously put on the table, would mean a reinvention of NATO whereby genuine consensus and not an American diktat would manage the alliance.  This was utterly unacceptable to the American leadership and Putin got as reward for his efforts the abrogation of the ABM treaty, which marked the resumption of the quest for strategic nuclear superiority over Russia first announced by President Reagan but supposedly abandoned once the Cold War ended.

This in turn led to a switch over in Moscow to Plan B, and in 2003 Russia joined Belgium, France and Germany in refuting the arguments for war over Saddam Hussein’s arms of mass destruction, withholding approval of the pending US invasion in the UN Security Council.  This blow to the international legitimacy of America’s Iraqi adventure in turn set the US course of denigration of Putin and of Russia as a whole which has brought us to the New Cold War.

In the course of the ten plus years since America’s ‘shock and awe’ roll out of its unilateral policies, there have been re-sets on both sides, but only Russia has held to a Plan A envisioning strategic partnership whereas the United States, at best, was prepared to engage in joint efforts at resolving specific problems like cutting nuclear strategic offensive systems or preventing nuclear proliferation in the Iran case.  

As I wrote even a year after the fateful Russian-Georgian War, I had no doubts that a significant party within the Kremlin leadership still hoped for a Russia in NATO.

See: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/sitemap/free/2009/8/article/saving-the-world-over-a-goblet-of-bordeaux/380922.html

At the same time, the official Russian policy had become to restrain NATO through a new Europe-wide security treaty and corresponding mechanisms of state-to-state relations giving Russia genuinely secure borders.

That was all before the venomous information war that we have seen over the past two years and before the risk of a hot war between NATO and Russian forces in Ukraine that developed this past summer and has not entirely receded given the shakiness of the truce that has suspended a proxy war.

All of these issues merit far more attention than they have received from international affairs specialists in the United States, least of all on the pages of Foreign Affairs magazine.

© Gilbert Doctorow, 2014
      
G. Doctorow is an occasional guest lecturer at St. Petersburg State University and Research Fellow of the American University in Moscow. His latest book, Stepping Out of Line: Collected (Nonconformist) Essays on Russian-American Relations, 2008-12, is available in paperback and e-book from Amazon.com and affiliated websites worldwide.

All statements in this report are an opinion of the author. Act at your own risk. Russia & America Goodwill Association (RAGA) is not responsible for the content of the article. Any views or opinions presented in this report are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of RAGA. Any liability in respect to this communication remain with the author.

RAGA News
www.RAGA.org

By Gilbert Doctorow -  the Founder of the European office, Committee on East-West Accord

George Soros’s press conference in Brussels on Thursday, 23 October, had one unifying theme, his loathing of Russia.

Nominally it was to publicize his latest essay, “Wake Up, Europe” released several days ago on the online edition of The New York Review of Books and already republished in various world newspapers of record in local languages.

But both in his introductory remarks and in answers to questions from the floor Soros also went into a variety of side issues, making at times some genuinely newsworthy statements.  In this short essay we will examine first what Soros said and second what was written for him.

The setting for the event was a two-day Global Briefing seminar of the Brussels-based International Crisis Group which otherwise was taking place behind closed doors for the benefit of participants sponsored by their companies, embassies and NGO employers.

But when you put up more than $50,000 a year in sponsorship contributions, as Soros does for the ICG, you get perks like the 45 minutes of on-record prime time just after lunch with journalists invited in as Soros did on Thursday. The moderator was of appropriate stature, ICG co-chair Lord Malloch-Brown.

The anti-Russia sound bites came at the very beginning of Soros’s chat. The wake-up call he is making concerns an ‘existential threat’ to Europe’s values and way of life coming from the big neighbor to the East.

Russia is a ‘sham democracy.’  It is a ‘Mafia State.’ Russia represents the use of force. Russia is expansionist abroad and repressive at home. And Europe is unprepared to deal with this alternative and till now successful model of governance.

Europe is disunited, passive and unhappy with itself and with the measures put in place to deal with the 2008 global financial melt-down from which it never recovered. Instead of solidarity and equality of Member States, the crisis has pitted the strong states against the weak and too many of Europe’s citizens have turned against the ideals of a united Europe that works against their material interests.

So far, so good. But when Soros moved on to explain how the New Ukraine has a better grasp of European democracy than the EU itself and is fighting Europe’s fight against the Russian threat, he went off the rails and landed in the surreal. 

This New Ukraine, in Soros’ view, is the embodiment of democratic principles: of rule of law, fighting corruption, structural reform. It is on the front line against an imperialist minded, aggressive Russia. Therefore, it is in Europe’s interest to provide this New Ukraine with military assistance and financial aid, which immediately equates to 19-20 billion dollars.

Soros insisted that he knows Ukraine well from the time in the 1990s when he set up his pro-democracy NGO there. And while his recent visits there came after an absence of ten years, he has no doubt of his grasp of the situation in Kiev nor does he question the sincerity of its new government.

Some in the audience were unconvinced. One representative of the Mafia State, a Russian political scientist who was a presenter in the morning session on Ukraine, courteously questioned Soros on the reality of a New Ukraine when so many oligarchs from the Old Ukraine continue to wield power and command militias around the country and when officials at the top including President Poroshenko himself served in previous governments. Soros was unmoved and did not deign to respond.

When asked about the just released Human Rights Watch condemnation of use of cluster bombs by the Kiev government, Soros agreed this was very regrettable and he said he himself flagged the issue in a tiny box that is part of his essay. 

Of course, neither he nor anyone else in the room bothered to mention one nasty detail: the alleged use of cluster bombs by Government forces was directed against residential districts and schools, aimed almost exclusively at the civilian population.

Soros has never been bashful about leveraging his philanthropic/cultural activities to serve his speculative ventures as financier. And so he used the press conference to appeal to Europe to supervise a debt exchange program that would effectively bail out bond holders of Ukrainian sovereign debt, to the tune of the $19 billion falling due in the coming year, and not to accede to a Cyprus or Greek type ‘bail-in’ or ‘haircut’ for the investors that would amount to default and cut off Ukraine from international financing of its private industrial recovery. 

This sounds nice, but as of the start of 2014, $7 billion of that sovereign debt was held by one U.S. company, Franklin Templeton.  Turning those short term bonds into a modern day equivalent of Brady bonds with EU and US guarantees would clearly serve the interests of Soros’s friends in the investment community; and who knows, since Soros did not volunteer full disclosure and was asked by no one for transparency, how much of that debt he and companies he controls hold.

Soros was effusive in his praise for Angela Merkel whose background in the GDR had enlightened her to the real nature of Russia. He noted how Merkel has rallied Member States to face down Russia over Crimea and over the insurgency in the Donbas.

However, without missing a beat, Soros informed the audience that Merkel is leading the troops in the wrong direction.  Her sanctions policy prompts tit for tat responses from Russia that are harming the still fragile European economy by pushing it into recession. Her austerity medicine to cure Europe’s indebtedness are leading to deflation, where what the EU needs right now is reflation. It is with reflation that Europe can afford to advance the $20 billion that Ukraine needs immediately to avoid default.

One journalist in the audience asked how as one of the world’s preeminent financiers George Soros could limit his discussion of Ukraine’s financial woes to the $20 billion it needs immediately to cover sovereign debt repayment and ignore the $200 billion that now is widely talked about as the cost of Ukraine’s implementation of the Association Agreement with the EU that it has signed and ratified, a number which matches, by the way, what some of Yanukovich’s staff put forward in November 2013 to explain their decision to postpone conclusion of that Agreement pending its revision.

Soros responded with a rambling allusion to how the Ukrainian diaspora and Ukrainian entrepreneurs released from the legacy of mismanagement and theft that despoiled this rich country in the 20 years since its independence would easily find this money, of course if they were not hindered by a default on sovereign debt held by his friends.

Soros’s introductory remarks picked many of the raisins from the cake of his article ‘Rise Up, Europe.’ It has many allegations against Vladimir Putin and his actions in and around Ukraine that are disputed and unproven, such as that Russia ‘established separatist enclaves in eastern Ukraine,’ ‘invaded Ukraine with regular armed forces’ in August, ‘is offering but failing to sign a deal for gas supplies,’ and otherwise is engaged in machinations aimed at forcing Poroshenko to appoint a premier who abandons the Maidan program.

Soros predicts that the Russians will next ‘open by force a land route from Russia to Crimea and Transdnistria’ or, alternatively, they will ‘sit back and await the economic and financial collapse of Ukraine,’ anticipating ‘a grand bargain’ with the United States whereby Russia would be granted its hegemony over its Near Abroad. 

Victorious Russia could then become ‘still more influential within the EU and pose a potent threat to the Baltic states with their large ethnic Russian populations.’

These emotive scenarios might be dismissed as intentionally alarmist and unrealistic if they did not bear the signature of the great philanthropist and financier. Who writes this tripe for Mr. Soros?  He has no shortage of ghostwriters from the various publishing and think tank projects he finances.

This past week we saw in the scandal surrounding Ben Judah’s interview in Politico with former Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Radoslaw Sikorski what comes of Soros giving free rein to his minions who believe they can defame Vladimir Putin and Russia with impunity. 

Journalists and pundits receive grants and research appointments from institutions where George Soros is present at the creation and remains trustee or board member and significant financial contributor. 

Such is the case of Ben Judah, who is not merely a widely published author and journalist but a Policy Fellow at the London-based European Council of Foreign Relations, headed by a journalist-administrator whom Soros has moved from one of his projects to another. Its policy interests reflecting Mr. Soros’s core beliefs. In simpler terms, the ECRF is merely a new face for his now discredited Open Society offices.

 Press coverage of Soros’s appearance in Brussels has followed the master script of his handouts. Bloomberg.com was typically obsequious to the billionaire. However, not everyone was taken in. “Soros has gone mad.”  Such was the remark of a worldly wise New York attorney who was in Paris on the 23rd and found the “Wake Up, Europe” in Le Monde. He e-mailed his shock to some friends in Manhattan.

The remark was passed along in typical digital age daisy chain. As Longfellow wrote some time ago,  “Whom the Gods would destroy they first make mad.” 

© Gilbert Doctorow, 2014
      
G. Doctorow is an occasional guest lecturer at St. Petersburg State University and Research Fellow of the American University in Moscow. His latest book, Stepping Out of Line: Collected (Nonconformist) Essays on Russian-American Relations, 2008-12, is available in paperback and e-book from Amazon.com and affiliated websites worldwide.

All statements in this report are an opinion of the author. Act at your own risk. Russia & America Goodwill Association (RAGA) is not responsible for the content of the article. Any views or opinions presented in this report are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of RAGA. Any liability in respect to this communication remain with the author.

RAGA News
www.RAGA.org

Dear friends of the Russia & America Good Will Association and antiwar colleagues!

As Antidote # 5 against Western anti-Russian propaganda, I'm happy to forward what I got from Ed Lozansky:

<<Today, roughly 40 percent of the supplies for US troops in Afghanistan move through the Northern Distribution Nethrk across Russia.As the US military prepares to draw down in Afghanistan, the NDN likely will continue to grow in importance>>

<<according to the latest polls the solid majority of Americans disapprove Obama’s foreign policy and only 13 % approve the job done by Congress. This is the good sign which shows that perhaps the Western civilization still has a chance to bring back the world’s respect and admiration but this could happen only if American political landscape changes dramatically and finds the strength to recover from the devastating policy f a i l u r e s  o f   C l i n t o n , Bu s h  a n d O b a m a  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s .>>
http://media.washtimes.com/media/misc/2014/10/02/amspadea100214.pdf

Sharon Tennison sends her greetings from Russia:
<<MOSCOW, September 29. /ITAR-TASS/. Anti-Russian trade sanctions imposed by Western countries and Moscow retaliatory restrictive measures against European countries did not split Russian society, says a poll conducted by Russia's state-run All-Russia Public Opinion Research Centre (VCIOM) on request by ITAR-TASS Political Analysis Center in August 2014. As many as 1,660 respondents from half of the country's regions participated in the public opinion poll. The results show most Russians take the harsh current situation with understanding and do not attach much importance to the sanctions war. The survey showed that 92% of those asked did not notice after-effects of sanctions imposed on Russia. Only 4% have noticed price growth.>>

Martin Sieff sends from Washington DC his insights about NATO Summit in Wales
http://en.ria.ru/analysis/20140906/192682387/NATO-Summit-in-Wales-Further-Deepened-Chasm-Between-Russia-NATO.html

<<"It is essential for the peace of Europe and the world that the United States and NATO return to the policy of seeking constructive dialogue and partnership with Russia," Sieff underlined.>>

Lisa Atfield echoes the recent US-Russia Moscow Forum from London:
<<The main message at the Forum was that the USA, Europe and Russia should focus their efforts on creating “peace and prosperity in all of the Northern Hemisphere from Vancouver to Vladivostok.”>>

As to the guiding symbol of this Peace and Prosperity effort, Lisa liked RAGA's attitude that the choice should not be between the American Bald Eagle or Russian Double-Headed Eagle, nor any other European bird of prey but rather "the Pelican the Provider who teaches the needy how to fish"

http://www.shoutoutuk.org/2014/09/17/us-russia-forum-working-together-not-against/

While the standard of living in Russia, while still relatively low, has been steadily rising, this cannot be said of the US:

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/crisis-middle-class-and-american-power#axzz3FC4znpFL
The Crisis of the American Middle Class

<<The median household income of Americans in 2011 was $49,103. Adjusted for inflation, the median income is just below what it was in 1989 and is $4,000 less than it was in 2000. Take-home income is a bit less than $40,000 when Social Security and state and federal taxes are included. That means a monthly income, per household, of about $3,300. It is urgent to bear in mind that half of all American households earn less than this. It is also vital to consider not the difference between 1990 and 2011, but the difference between the 1950s and 1960s and the 21st century. This is where the difference in the meaning of middle class becomes most apparent.>>

And the situation is hardly much better in 2014

Read more: The Crisis of the Middle Class and American Power | Stratfor 
Follow us: @stratfor on Twitter | Stratfor on Facebook

Malice to None. Good Will  to All. 
Peace and Justice to the World.
миру мир и благоволение в сердцах

 From RAGA site:
"We are an association of Americans who believe it is in the U.S. national interests to foster friendship with Russia on the basis of mutual Good Will and non-interference in each other's affairs. RAGA is a gathering of people who share common interests in Russia's history, culture, religion, economy, politics and the way of life. We feel that Russian people have made outstanding contributions to humankind and are capable of greater achievements. We envision Russia as a strong, independent, proud and free nation and as a partner in achieving peace in the world."

Sincerely,
W George Krasnow (=Vladislav Krasnov)
President, RAGA

All statements in this report are an opinion of the author. Act at your own risk. Russia & America Goodwill Association (RAGA) is not responsible for the content of the article. Any views or opinions presented in this report are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of RAGA. Any liability in respect to this communication remain with the author.

RAGA News
www.RAGA.org

Dear friends of the Russia & America Good Will Association and antiwar colleagues!

On September 16, 2014, RAGA issued the antidote # 3 in order to minimize the effect of anti-Russian info war by Western mass media. As a cure we suggested a sort of American Committee for East-West Accord (that was effective during the Cold War) to be re-created under the name of East-West Dialog.

I am forwarding the article NGOs Shouldn't Suffer in Sanction War by RAGA associate Dr. Gilbert Doctorow. The article appeared in The Moscow Times, a newspaper not known for warm feeling for the place where it is published.
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/ngos-shouldn-t-suffer-in-sanction-war/507765.html

We hope this signals a change of climate at The Moscow Times. RAGA is one of those NGOs suffering in sanction war that Gilbert describes:

<<All of these dedicated and idealistic people have their eyes open and know the weaknesses of Russian society; none is a dupe of Putin. But what they all have in common now is a very adverse climate back in the U.S. for their activities. Not only has administrative support from U.S. agencies been withdrawn, but the information war has poisoned the atmosphere in which they operate. >>

Although RAGA never received any support from U. S. agencies, we do inhale the "poison in the atmosphere". That's why we rely on the antidotes. That's why we eagerly participated in the US-Russia Forum in Moscow on September 8 and 9, 2014 which <<ended its deliberations with a unanimous vote in support of re-creating the premiere platform for detente from the period of 1974 to 1992, the American Committee on East-West Accord. The added value of that body will be to help dampen the information war by challenging the lies coming from all sides involved. It will arrange neutral platforms for genuine debate of the key issues determining state-to-state relations, most immediately the sanctions policy and the expansion of NATO to Ukraine and Georgia.>>

RAGA will continue to foster Good Will on both sides no matter what, because "We are an association of American and Russian citizens who believe it's in the U.S. and Russia's national interests to develop mutual friendship and cooperation on the basis of Good will" as our front page has always proclaimed.

For a fuller version of Gilbert's Moscow Times article see RAGA site .

I also recommend the following articles:

September 25, 2014
RUSSIAN FEDERATION SITREP
http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/
by Patrick Armstrong

September 19, 2014
Russia Sanctions Report By Sharon Tennison
http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/

How sanctions are hastening the world without the West
September 13, 2014 By Rakesh Krishnan Simha    
http://in.rbth.com/blogs/2014/09/13/how_sanctions_are_hastening_the_world_without_the_west_38269.html

Ed Lozansky's article was published both in English and in Russian
"Just How Civilized Is the Western Civilization?" 
http://us-russia.org/2668-just-how-civilized-is-the-western-civilization.html

КАРТ-БЛАНШ. Насколько цивилизованна западная цивилизация?
http://www.ng.ru/world/2014-09-25/3_kartblansh.html
Америка не использовала шанс интегрировать Россию в западные структуры

Professor Gvosdev shows historical background of Russian-Ukrainian relations which have been so complicated and intertwined that the likes of Henry Kissinger and Jack Matlock Jr. advised President Obama to steer away from meddling:

Ukraine's Ancient Hatreds
Nikolas K. Gvosdev 's June 29, 2014 article in The National Interests
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/ukraines-ancient-hatreds-10736?page=6
Nikolas K. Gvosdev is a professor of national-security studies at the U.S. Naval War College and a contributing editor at The National Interest and co-author of Russian Foreign Policy: Interests, Vectors and Sectors (CQ Press, 2013).

At the Forum in Moscow I met a number of interesting people, such as Raymond McGovern, a disaffected former CIA official, Anja Maria Estrada, a peace activist from Germany; Iben Thanholm, a journalist from Denmark; Austin Ruse, Center for Family & Human Rights, USA; and Jan Wondra, National Chair of Families for Russian and Ukrainian Adoption.

Speaking at the Forum, Jan pointed out that while there are some regrettable and tragic cases of abuse among 60,000 adopted children, the vast majority of families are doing a good job in fostering the adopted children whom they want to be proud of their heritage. Therefore, the current anti-Russian media campaign needs to be countered by a more positive view of both Russia and Ukraine, even for childrens' sake.

And there were at the Forum those who accepted the challenge. One of them was Charles Bausman who edits Russia Insider, a new portal for informed, unbiased and independent opinion of Russia. I immediately got their free subscription and am happy to share with you what I got:


Sep 24, 2014 08:38 am | RI Staff
Meet 'Mr. Yuan': The Currency Trader Helping Russia Defy Western Sanctions
Moscow’s ‘Mr. Yuan’ Builds China Link as Putin Tilts East, originally from
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-09-23/moscow-s-mr-yuan-builds-china-link-as-putin-tilts-east.html

Former Czech President Vaclav Klaus finds "US/EU Propaganda Against Russia Ridiculous". By  Neil Clark (The Spectator - excerpt) 
http://russia-insider.com/en/politics_ukraine_opinion_media_watch/2014/09/27/02-32-02pm/former_czech_president_useu_propaganda

Funny and Touching youTube: A Russian Grandma's Advice to Obama (viral video)
http://russia-insider.com/en/politics_ukraine_opinion_christianity_society/2014/09/27/03-11-04pm/funny_and_touching_russian 

I especially liked Grandma's invitation to Obama to go with her to a Russian Church to pray jointly for keeping the "fascists" away from Ukraine. In 2012 I myself sent Obama a letter of invitation to re-visit my native Perm which he had visited as then-Senator jointly with Senator Lugar to review Russian compliance with the mutually agreed upon program of nuclear arms controls. The visit was to take place after Obama's presidential term ended. One cafe in Perm was named in honor of Barack Obama, so I promised to take him there, all treats on me. But the latest I heard is that, although cafe is still in existence, it had to "introduce sanctions against the American Dream"! Which most certainly means there would be no hamburgers served, nor Coca Cola. Otherwise, my invitation stilI stands.

After attending the Forum in Moscow, I went to another conference, The All-Russian Forum-Dialog on inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations that took place in my native city of Perm on September 17-18 and 19. All emphasis was on dialog.The consensus among the scholars was that Western sanctions had the effect of enhancing the unity of the Russian nation across diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds. It was also agreed that a dialog should be used not just among scholars but also between the government and civil society. When I spoke, I quoted Mark Twain:

“Patriotism is supporting your country all the time and your government when it deserves it.” 
"Патриот должен поддерживать свою страну всегда, а правительство только тогда, когда оно этого заслуживает".

My quoting the famed American writer won an applause especially because Twain is as well known in Russia as the USA.

The antiwar rally in Perm announced last Sunday September 21, 2014, had fewer than 200 people. It was organized as a protest against Putin's foreign policy, as part of several demonstrations in major Russian cities. But the rally was very small for the city of million people. Besides, many of those who came, protested not the Russian, but against Ukrainian government.
http://fedpress.ru/news/society/news_society/1411372224-na-permskii-marsh-mira-prishli-storonniki-nezavisimosti-donetskoi-i-luganskoi-respublik

As I am now heading from Perm to Moscow, I cannot resist inviting those near the Russian capital to a couple of lectures given in native-fluency English at English Language Evenings (ELE Moscow) at the Chekhov Cultural Center downtown Moscow. This NGO has been run by the tireless American philosopher "idealist" Stephen Lapeyrouse, for more than fifteen years. Check the link: http://www.elemoscow.net/

October 3, 2014 NOTE: This lecture will take place in the "reading room" of the Chekhov Library; the entrance is from Strastnoi Bulvar 8. "Custine and Co: Foreign Writers in Russia through the Ages" By Jennifer Eremeeva, an American Author, Blogger

and October 17, 2014 lecture by David Wansbrough, an Australian philosopher, painter, and anthropologist (and friend of RAGA and myself).

"What is 'Truth'?" (Following on his talk on "Beauty" last ELE season, and his talk on "Goodness" on September 19 -- in this lecture David will address the final of the three verities of many philosophers.)

Stephen does a tremendous job of promoting mutual cultural understanding and cooperation by setting up interesting topics and speakers, successfully steering away from unnecessary political confrontations.

I wish we had Russian Language Evenings in Washington DC to encourage Americans to learn Russian.

Pics in attachment are: the first one is me, Anja Maria Estrada of Germany, and Ray McGovern of the USA; 2nd is Ray speaking at the Forum; the 3rd is opening the Forum Dialog in Perm, the 4th is Perm's famous cannon said to be heavier than the Tsar Cannon in the Moscow Kremlin, and it was operational too, it is shown at a Cannon-and Rocket Museum under open sky where all visitors to Perm are invited, I am sure Senators Obama and Richard Lugar saw it too; the 5th is the break dance scene after the Moscow Forum on Arbat Street.

Please be patient while the RAGA site is being rebuilt. Don't hesitate to comment, even to disagree.  We need volunteers TOO. Meanwhile join https://www.facebook.com/RAGAforPeace

Malice to None. Good Will  to All. 
Peace and Justice to the World.
миру мир и благоволение в сердцах

From RAGA site:
"We are an association of Americans who believe it is in the U.S. national interests to foster friendship with Russia on the basis of mutual Good Will and non-interference in each other's affairs. RAGA is a gathering of people who share common interests in Russia's history, culture, religion, economy, politics and the way of life. We feel that Russian people have made outstanding contributions to humankind and are capable of greater achievements. We envision Russia as a strong, independent, proud and free nation and as a partner in achieving peace in the world."

Sincerely,
W George Krasnow (=Vladislav Krasnov)
President, RAGA

All statements in this report are an opinion of the author. Act at your own risk. Russia & America Goodwill Association (RAGA) is not responsible for the content of the article. Any views or opinions presented in this report are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of RAGA. Any liability in respect this communication remain with the author.

RAGA News
www.RAGA.org

Ukraine is in a desperate economic state, with massive debt and on a brink of a complete monetary collapse. Ukrainian government is openly asking US and EU to bail them out. The country and the people urgently need substantial revenue and debt free cash. 

And yet, in light of all of this they somehow can afford the luxury of destroying historically, and more importantly – financially valuable monuments, solely for crowd entertainment. This simply doesn’t make any sense. If certain regions of Ukraine wish to get rid of everything that reminds them of communism – there is a better and more profitable way to do so!

Before I make my proposal, a disclaimer has to be made. I am not, by any means, advocating for indiscriminate deconstruction and sale of Lenin, as well as any other, Soviet statues in Ukraine or elsewhere. I firmly believe that all of these statues must remain where they are, and be protected by the local government, regardless of the fact that some percentage of the population finds them offensive. Removal of these statues is illegal and inappropriate for a civil and democratic society. Further more, UNESCO as well as the world community should step in, and take a more proactive role in protecting them.

With this said, the reality of the actual situation on the ground in most parts of Ukraine (and Eastern Europe at large) is simply incompatible with my idealistic views in the previous paragraph. The rate and the sheer amount of Soviet statues that have already been destroyed shows that the only options are - a violent teardown or a quiet deconstruction with subsequent destruction of these historic monuments.

I cannot agree with this line of thinking and thus wish to propose another viable and bipartisan alternative.

Lenin statues are worth a great deal of money to private collectors, museums and art funds, not only for the obvious nations like Russia or China, but to Western nations like United States, Great Britain, Germany, France and many others. The value of a single statue, on average, is approximately $100,000 US. Many statues are worth much more than that.

A lot of these statues have their own unique history and provenance like the larger than life-size (3.45 meters / 11.32 feet) Lenin monument, erected on Kiev's  Khreshchatyk Street in 1946, that was built by Soviet sculptor Sergey Merkurov from the same red Karelian stone as Lenin's Mausoleum in Moscow, and was even displayed at the 1939 New York World's Fair (1). These historic facts equate to today’s hard cash and Ukraine should take advantage of this by selling their Soviet statues to people and organizations officially at open auctions.  

How to do this right? Those regions in Ukraine, and Eastern Europe at large, where people feel strongly against these monuments that they wish to have them removed, the municipalities should hold an official vote, and if the majority votes for the monument to stay – the monument stays; if they vote to have it removed - the monument is put for an auction.  Authorities should issue an official removal permit, initiate a selling process, and make sure all proceeds would go to the local population.

A special provision must be made to account for situations where people vote for the statue to stay however authorities cannot guarantee its safety due to significant amount of protesters who may ignore the law and use violent means to tear down the statue anyway. Social experts that are advising the government must account for this factor and inform the municipality of such risks. If the likelihood that this statue will be destroyed is very high, authorities should engage the majority of the population on how to proceed further. In such cases the sale may be the only option available to protect the monument.

To note, the removal and shipping of the statue is done at buyers expense, however until the statue is sold it may stay where it is, so not to incur any additional expenses. All in all this is not a substantial issue considering the costs: shipping & container - $5000 US; deconstruction - $2000 US, on average. Due to low labour wages in Ukraine buyers should not expect to pay more than $7000 US for regular size statues that can fit in a large shipping container. Considering the over all value of the purchase, such shipping and handling frees are more than reasonable.

I am confident that there would be many buyers, especially from China, interested in purchasing Lenin statues for more than $100,000 US, each! This is a win-win for all sides because the municipality and the local people will get the much needed cash, the buyer will get a unique historic artwork and the statue itself is not lost forever. 

Statue of Lenin In Seattle! "There is a 16 foot (5 m) bronze sculpture of Communist revolutionary Vladimir Lenin located in the Fremont neighborhood of Seattle, Washington.... The statue was constructed by a Slovak Bulgarian sculptor, Emil Venkov, under commission from the Soviet and Czechoslovak governments... Lewis E. Carpenter, who was teaching English in Poprad, offered to buy it for $13,000. With the help of the original sculptor, the statue was professionally cut into three pieces and shipped to the United States at a total cost of $41,000... It now stands two blocks northward at the intersection of Evanston Ave N, N 36th St, and Fremont Place, outside a falafel shop and a gelato shop... The Carpenter family continues to seek a buyer for the statue. The asking price as of 2006 is $250,000, up from a 1995 price tag of $150,000."

Text and image source: 
wikipedia.org/wiki/Statue_of_Lenin,_Seattle

Another viable alternative is creating a Soviet theme park where these statues can be brought to from all over the country and act as a tourist attraction. This was successfully done in Lithuania, a former USSR republic, by a local entrepreneur who created a place called - Grūtas Park (www.grutoparkas.lt). This private park is successfully attracting local and foreign visitors solely because of the Soviet statues that the owner was able to buy, move and preserve there. Ukraine now has the same choice to make – lose these valuable artworks or make money on them. Considering the state of the economy and widespread poverty, the choice is clear.

Personally, I think the government of the Russian Federation should step forward and create a special fund, with the sole purpose of preserving  all statues and monuments created by the USSR, regardless of their location; and in the event where they cannot be preserved - purchasing and relocating these historic artworks back to Russia.

Lastly and just to be clear: Soviet monuments that are not under immediate danger should stay where they are and not be sold unless threatened with demolition.

By Dmitry Tamoikin
President of Tamoikin Art Fund
Founder of Soviet Jewelry Project
CEO of Earth Sphere Development Corporation
Contributor to Russia & America Goodwill Association

Sources:

1. youtu.be/xye36G6J7XY
2. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fall_of_the_monument_to_Lenin_in_Kiev
3. www.grutoparkas.lt
4. www.youtube.com/results?search_query=leninfall
5. www.youtube.com/results?search_query=leninopad
6. www.youtube.com/results?search_query=%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%BF%D0%B0%D0%B4
7. uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9B%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%96%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%BF%D0%B0%D0%B4
8. www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/24/leninopad-falling-lenins-statues-ukraine_n_4847364.html
9. www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26313792
10. www.1tv.ru/news/world/268581
11. www.1tv.ru/news/world/268625
12. leninstatues.ru/leninopad
13. www.russkiivopros.com/?pag=one&id=564&kat=9&csl=65
14. www.segodnya.ua/ukraine/Leninopad-v-Ukraine-Samye-gromkie-snosy-i-skolko-ostalos-.html
15. glavred.info/zhizn/leninopad-v-harkove-opublikovany-foto-i-video-291414.html
16. tvrain.ru/articles/leninopad_kak_v_ukraine_snosili_pamjatniki_ilichu-375975/
17. twitter.com/hashtag/%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%BF%D0%B0%D0%B4
18. news.bigmir.net/ukraine/852460-Leninopad-Kak-ykrainci-raspravlyautsya-s-Ilichem
19. www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26306737
20. /www.youtube.com/watch?v=wh3qXQVh7y0
21. www.youtube.com/watch?v=XL4LUrcKy5U

Editors notes: This article is not meant to imply the author's or RAGA's agreement with, or sympathy for, Soviet system or ideology. We merely argue for a civilized approach to monuments regardless of the political image they had during the period when they were erected. In particular, we deplore the use of Leninopad as a means to incite ethnic, national or racial hatred against any group of Ukrainian citizens

All statements in this report are an opinion of the author. Act at your own risk. Russia & America Goodwill Association (RAGA) is not responsible for the content of the article. Any views or opinions presented in this report are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of RAGA. Any liability in respect this communication remain with the author.

RAGA News
www.RAGA.org

Institutions shape people, but then again people change and, at times, subvert the institutions in which they sit. There is no better illustration of this ancient piece of folk wisdom than the just published booklet entitled Costs of a New Cold War: The US-Russia Confrontation over Ukraine from the Center for the National Interest (NI),which is now on the hot reading list of Washington insiders, if its promotion by Johnson’s Russia List may be taken as an indicator.

In the brief mission statement which NI places on all its publications, management reminds us that the institution began its life as the curator of the political legacy of President Richard Nixon. Indeed for years it operated under the name of The Nixon Center. And though its present interests are global hot spots, the Center’s core mission was reflected in its founder, Russian émigré Dmitri Simes, who had served as Richard Nixon’s go-to man on his post-presidential trips to Russia and became his designated president of the Center.

For these reasons the booklet Costs of a New Cold Warshows just how far the legacy of Realpolitik has been clipped and marginalized by the resurgent forces of Neoconservatism in Washington and in the think tanks spread across the country. Although this collection has authors expressing various points of view, and is structured to present 2 Russian and 2 American perspectives on the East-West confrontation, I would draw attention to the introduction by editor Paul J. Saunders, and more especially to the essay by Thomas Graham, a director of Kissinger Associates and probably the most powerful and influential of the contributors.

Graham’s "Dangers of a New Containment Policy for Russia” sets out almost without comment the official American policy directed at degrading if not destroying Russia’s economy with further ratcheted up sanctions from which the only way back appears to be regime change. Graham makes it plain that Washington is determined to break every bone in the Russian body politic. Both his essay and that of Paul Saunders are imbued with American triumphalism and assume as a given American global hegemony. Such hegemony, of course, is the very antithesis of Realpolitik policies such as Richard Nixon pursued, where balance of power is the assumed script.

Thus, Kissinger Associates is now run by the supporter of a political philosophy totally at variance with the much more nuanced and genuinely Realpolitik views of its founder. Thus the National Interest is putting into circulation Neoconservative views that run totally counter to what its nominal publisher and president Dmitri Simes says on Russian state television.

The assumption that the US can and will do far more damage to Russia and that Russia, in the short term, can do little or nothing to retaliate is supported by the feeble essays representing the Russian side. Fedor Lukyanov is an IR theorist who directs his attention to medium or long term Russian efforts to change global governance, though the confrontation will likely be resolved in the short term. Igor Yurgens’ main concern is how the sanctions damage the position of his fellow Liberals and give control over the Russian economy and polity to their opponents in the Kremlin camp. Any strike back by the Kremlin is outside his field of interest.

The authors of the book all believe that Washington is calling the shots and it is Russia's lot to suffer, largely in silence and ineffectually because it is by far the weaker party in the fight. But then they are assuming total rationality, they are not thinking about the unthinkable. I invite our panel to do just that.

In that regard, let us remember that none other than the great Realist Richard Nixon demonstrated in his Christmas bombing of North Viet Nam that seemingly irrational behavior can be used by great powers when they are pressed.

The questions for discussion are how do we imagine Russia can strike back at short term existential threats which the American scenario by Graham sets out? Will they turn off the valves on gas deliveries to Germany, for example? And at what point can destructive economic warfare by the USA and the EU trigger a military response from Russia, such as a strike that ends in the capture of Kiev and overthrow of its government?

The topic for the Discussion Panel is provided by Gilbert Doctorow,
Gilbert Doctorow is a Research Fellow of the American University in Moscow.

© Gilbert Doctorow, 2014

G. Doctorow is an occasional guest lecturer at St. Petersburg State University and Research Fellow of the American University in Moscow. His latest book, Stepping Out of Line: Collected (Nonconformist) Essays on Russian-American Relations, 2008-12, is available in paperback and e-book from Amazon.com and affiliated websites worldwide.

Expert Panel Contributions:


Blindness and Insouciance
By Martin Sieff

Martin Sieff is a national columnist for the Post-Examiner online newspapers and a senior fellow of the American University in Moscow

Over the past quarter century Thomas Graham has earned a deserved reputation as one of the most experienced and skillful American diplomats dealing with Russia. This makes the program he outlined for "containing” Russia in The National Interest so extraordinary and even alarming.

The first flaw to be pointed out in Graham’s program is that it assumes total passivity and passive acceptance on the part of Russia’s leaders and its people in the face of the program he outlines. There is nothing "realpolitik” or "realist” about this assumption. On the contrary, if we are to accept any validity to Hans Morgenthau’s political science model of "realism,” we must acknowledge that great powers will always follow what they perceive to be their best interests. However, the unavoidable conclusion to be drawn from the Graham program is that any attempt at accommodation or passive acceptance by Russia of that program would be a waste of time. For if the Graham program were to be implemented by the Obama administration or any future one, Russia would be left with no option except to oppose the US program with reciprocal or greater force in the very real interest of its own survival.

The second flaw is that Graham’s program is neat and tidy. It does not go into dirty details of what its implementation might lead Russia to do. Henry Kissinger, the founder of Kissinger Associates, in his great history Diplomacy never fails to point out how reckless, aggressive policies by any major power generate their own momentum, igniting secondary conflicts and consequences never envisaged by their architects. Graham is blind to this danger. He appears to blithely accept the reality of medium-term US policies that would be aimed at "degrading Russia’s capabilities and reducing its options for expanding its sway in the former Soviet space.” Even more irresponsibly, he appears to support long term U.S. policies aimed at "exacerbating internal tensions in Russia in the hope it would lead to the mellowing of the current regime or its overthrow.”

Graham, after presenting these possibilities, neglects however to consider how such openly expressed goals would be perceived in Russia, and what policies the Russians might feel constrained to follow in opposing them in the interest of their own survival.

Survival is not a light word in Russia. The Soviet Union lost 27 million dead, the vast majority of them ethnic Russians, in saving the world by inflicting 90 percent of the battle casualties incurred by the Nazi Wehrmacht through World War II. Within the past 25 years, well over 20 million Russians died prematurely in the dark decade of the 1990s, now falsely represented by US pundits and even some Russian liberals, as a lost "golden age” of freedom. They died because of the catastrophic results of the crash privatization program urged on Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and adopted by him, by US President Bill Clinton and his Undersecretary of the Treasury (and later Treasury Secretary) Secretary Lawrence H. Summers.

For the current generation of Russian leaders, therefore, the issue of resisting and defeating openly expressed plans in the Untied States and the West to "degrade” or "overthrow” their government, represents a real threat that could quickly lead to the deaths 20 million of their people, and great suffering for all of them.

Third, Graham also makes the extraordinary comment that the Ukraine crisis should be seen as a "godsend” for NATO, helping the alliance focus on the alleged new Russian threat after its withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq.

There are so many gaping holes in this line of alleged reasoning, one is almost at a loss to point out the most egregious ones. NATO’s operations out of theater in Afghanistan and elsewhere have been catastrophic failures. The last thing that the exhausted and weakened military forces of the alliance need is to be forced to confront a new artificially generated enemy that they cannot contain, and cannot even rely on popular support in their home countries for the increased levels of military spending that would be necessary to even initiate such a course of action.

Fourth, the confrontation and containment policies he advocates could not be limited to a Cold War. The new 21st century conflict between Russia and the West has already gone "hot.”

The war in Ukraine currently being waged is certainly not cold: It has led to at least 3,000 Ukrainian deaths in only eight months. Russia could respond to the toppling of the legitimate, democratically elected Ukrainian government in February by encouraging the toppling of pro-American governments in NATO allies in central and Eastern Europe, After all, what is sauce for the goose is also sauce for the gander, and it was the European Union, NATO and the United States that set the precedent of first embracing violent revolutionaries in previously stable democratic nations in the heart of Europe, embracing the repressive regimes they established and then urging those regimes to use lethal force to crush their own dissidents. That is what we have already seen in Ukraine. It is all too easy to project a scenario in which destructive economic warfare by the US and the EU will finally trigger a military response from Russia, such as a strike that ends in the capture of Kiev and overthrow of its government.

Finally, Graham neglects anywhere in his fantasy to deal with the ultimate threat: That the military confrontation between US and NATO forces directly facing Russia in Eastern Europe will set off a land war which would rapidly escalate into a full-scale nuclear exchange.

On October 8, one of the world’s leading experts on the dangers of nuclear weapons, Dr. Helen Caldicott, who founded the Nobel Peace-prize winning organization International Physicians against Nuclear War, explicitly warned of this risk at a press conference in the National Press Club in Washington, DC. Apart from an NPC employee recording her presentation, there were only six individuals in the entire audience, none of them from any significant U.S. news organization.

Caldicott took this extraordinarily dismissive response with good humor: But she also warned that it reflected the astonishing levels of denial among U.S. policymakers and media leaders about the very real and rapidly growing dangers of nuclear war. Graham in his National Interest article shows a similar extraordinary insouciance. He will not be so confident when the bombs start to fall on him.
_________________________________

Thinking the Unthinkable
By Stephen F. Cohen

Stephen F. Cohen is professor emeritus of Russian studies at New York University and professor emeritus of politics at Princeton University. His books include "Soviet Fates and Lost Alternatives: From Stalinism to the New Cold War.”

We are in a new Cold War. In America, the policy-makers say it’s not a Cold War, because they don’t want to take responsibility for it, because their policies since the 90s have led directly to this point.

About a year ago, in November 2013, there was a political dispute in Kiev about whether Yanukovych will sign the agreement with the EU. That political dispute, after the coup in February, became a Ukrainian civil war, generally speaking between Kiev and the South-East of Ukraine. The civil war then became what we call a "proxy war,” with the U.S. and NATO supporting Kiev and Moscow supporting the eastern Ukrainian rebels.

Some people think the ceasefire has averted the danger, but the ceasefire is not solid. We don’t know if it’s going to be here tomorrow or next week. The danger is that the proxy war would lead by accident or intention to the intervention of Russian military forces in the East and NATO forces in the West.

There’s been fighting for the Donetsk airport that never stopped. Suddenly in the past few days it appears that Kiev shelled Donetsk and it did that on the day that school began. They shelled some schools. It’s horrible...think of what’s happened.

Let’s say, Kiev attacks the Donbas again and Russia feels the need to help the Donbas militarily. Inside NATO they are discussing the possibility of NATO forces entering Western Ukraine in such an eventuality. Now, what would that mean? You would have the America-led NATO forces in Western Ukraine, whether on the ground or in the air, it doesn’t matter; and Russian forces in the air or on the ground. That would be a modern version of the Cuban Missile Crisis. We have to think the unthinkable.

Russia has the doctrine; they’ve had it since the 90s, because Russian conventional forces are weaker than American-NATO conventional forces. Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons if Western conventional forces threaten the Russian state and Russia. Meanwhile, as was announced in The New York Times on the front-page, President Obama is about to sign a budgetary decree for what he calls a "major modernization” of our nuclear arsenal at the cost of $1 trillion over 30 years.

Meanwhile, the Russian government has been, quote, "modernizing its nuclear weapons.” Let’s talk as adults. "Modernization” means buildup. So both sides are now building up their nuclear weapons. We’re in a new Cold War, we’re beginning a new nuclear arms race, and the danger is now immense. Does that mean there’s going to be war? No. The problem is to avert war you need leadership, political leadership, and the question of who’s leading correctly and who’s not is a political discussion, but the danger is there, absolutely, 100%.

Roughly speaking, there’s a "war party” in Washington, there’s a "war party” in NATO, in the EU. There’s a "war party” in Kiev, because Poroshenko is under attack in Kiev over the ceasefire. And there’s a "war party” in Moscow that feels that Putin should not have agreed to the ceasefire, that the rebels should have gone on and taken Mariupol, maybe Odessa and that he gave up too much in agreeing to end the fighting.. So, you’ve got forces in Washington, Kiev, Europe and Moscow who want more war

Russia is preparing for war as NATO moves closer to Russia. And something very important is often forgotten: missile defense. Russia has tried to compromise on where this missile defense would be located. Russia has proposed it to be joint, Russian-American. What did the U.S. do? They gave the missile defense project to NATO, so missile defense is now part of the NATO expansion. It’s not just NATO bases coming towards Russia, it’s the missile defense. Of course, the U.S. says the missile defense is not directed at Russia. But American scientists have said that in its fourth stage it will be able to strike down Russian missiles as they rise towards their ultimate trajectory. That means Russia will not have the deterrent and the nuclear peace that had been kept for 45 years, on the peculiar theory that has worked until now: that we won’t attack you because we know if we attack you, you will attack us and vice versa. Missile defense could end that.

For at least 15 years there was an agreement between NATO and Moscow that even if NATO would expand there would be no NATO permanent military bases in the countries that came in closer to Russia. But there’s been a group in NATO for years who wanted to do that. They’ve seized the Ukrainian crisis at the NATO Wales summit, a month ago, to create this so-called rapid deployment force of 4,000 men. What good are 4,000 men against the Russian army? Zero, but there’s a reason: there going to get bases, communication centers, barracks, air strips in Poland, in three Baltic countries, maybe in Romania. And that would be not only NATO expansion politically, which is what it was previously. It would be an actual military expansion.

It’s not too late to stop it. It’s not too late, if leadership does what leadership is supposed to do, if statesmen and women do what they are supposed to do. We can end this Ukrainian crisis and stop this military expansion of NATO. It’s not too late, but it’s five minutes to midnight.

_________________________________

Washington’s advanced intellectual sclerosis
By Vlad Sobell

Professor, Political Economy New York University, Prague

Judging from the latest booklet by the Center for the National Interest and, indeed, from mainstream analysis coming out of the US, Washington’s foreign policy-making establishment badly needs a reminder of the basic realities of great power politics – as well as a few elementary lessons in history. As Gilbert Doctorow notes, the booklet is imbued with American triumphalism. The notion that America could, in fact, be on the losing side is simply not considered.

Let me first list several reasons why the establishment should think again and then draw some obvious conclusions.

1. Any self-appointed "exceptional” and hence "indispensable” nation, "global leader” or primus inter pares is sooner or later going to encounter determined resistance from the "lesser” nations; and if the "leader” insists on pressing hard, the rest will form an alliance against him that will prove his undoing. This is why, despite centuries of permanent conflict, Europe never came to be governed by a stable centralised authority and why recent attempts at such control (under Napoleon and Hitler) ended in disaster for would-be hegemon.

2. It is surprising that today’s Washington seems to be completely ignorant of Yale historian Paul Kennedy’s common-sense notion of "imperial overstretch”, especially given the intractable crisis of the Washington Consensus economic model. (And that crisis is far from over – both the US and the EU remain over-leveraged and their monetary policies are set to remain in emergency mode for the foreseeable future.) Instead of charging headlong towards military confrontation with Russia, Washington should carefully examine whether in the coming decades its ambitions of global hegemony will correspond to its economic power.

3. Even more to the point, is the Pentagon able to pursue several apparently interminable campaigns simultaneously? Can it really take on the rapidly modernising Russian nuclear superpower and encircle the resurgent China while carrying on fighting its ill-defined "war on terror”— pushing for regime change in Syria and Iran and creating in the process treacherous and dangerous "allies” such as the IS?

4. Washington’s triumphalism is blinding it to the accelerated reversal of the "great divergence” (i.e., the decline of imperial China in the 19th century coinciding with the take-off of the Western economies). On the one hand, the US doggedly remains in denial about the causes of the economic crisis (failing to see that they are systemic and hence, arguably, incurable). On the other, it tends to play down the re-emergence of China, Russia and the rise of the other BRICs, because their success cannot be explained within the confines of the inflexible official ideology of "democratism”.

5. Since Washington is psychologically ill-equipped to grasp the destructive nature of Communist totalitarianism (having never experienced anything of the kind), it does not understand that having ditched Communism and steered clear of the failing Washington Consensus model, the post-Communist superpowers (Russia and China) will continue to shift the global economic (and hence technological and military) balance in their favour. And now, having imposed sanctions against Russia, the US is actively promoting the creation of a powerful economic and military Sino-Russian bloc in Eurasia. (Evidently, the US has not yet grasped that the Cold War-era Sino-Soviet split generated by arcane ideological disputes is definitely a thing of the past.)

6. Similarly, Washington fails to see that its allies – in particular "Old Europe”, Japan and Korea – will inevitably be seduced by the dynamic China-driven non-Western economy. Their political – and, to a far greater extent, business – elites will increasingly resent Washington’s demands for anti-Russian (or "anti-anyone”) sanctions, especially if those sanctions appear structured to enhance US economic interests at the expense of its allies. Hence they will do their utmost to resort to well-tried and -tested creative ways to circumvent or gradually erode any such sanctions.

The National Interest booklet gives a disturbing sense that the US establishment has irrevocably entered an advanced stage of intellectual sclerosis, not unlike that seen in Brezhnev’s Soviet Union, where dissent had no place in the highest reaches. If the pamphlet really is on "the hot reading list of Washington insiders” as Doctorow notes, then we must truly fear for America, its allies and indeed for the entire planet. It looks like the Empire will stagger on blindly expanding, until it finally over-reaches and implodes, causing huge collateral damage.

While I share Doctorow’s scathing assessment of the booklet’s contents, I would take issue with his blanket dismissal of the value of the Russian contributions. Yes, Igor Yurgens, speaking for Russian pro-Western liberals, has come up with the usual platitudes about the sanctions misfiring by strengthening the hand of Putin’s anti-Western hardliners. But Fyodor Lukyanov has, in my opinion, written a highly sophisticated analysis of the Kremlin’s actual or potential "asymmetric response” to America’s increasingly aggressive campaign against Russia.

Lukyanov notes a range of smart tactics Moscow can deploy: avoiding provocations designed to draw it into direct military confrontation with the US or its proxies (such as Putin’s refusal to occupy "Novorossiya” this summer); withholding Russia’s engagement in the resolution of conflicts that would benefit mainly the US (rather than Russia and/or the international community); allowing Washington to discredit itself – for example, when, contrary to its supposed guardianship of global rules and stability, it abuses those rules in its narrow self-interest (as in the case of the sanctions against Russia, which Moscow deems illegal); and working to help strengthen the alternative, BRIC-based global system, which is becoming increasingly immune to destabilising US machinations.

The subtitle of Lukyanov’s essay says it all: "As masters of judo teach, it is better not to rely on one's own strength but to instead use your opponent's strength against him." We can restate this (and amend it somewhat) as follows: Excessive power leads to triumphalism and arrogance; arrogance breeds intellectual degeneration and myopia; intellectual blindness causes overestimation of one’s strength and underestimation of that of your adversary; intelligently targeted strikes by a nimble adversary (trained, like Putin, in the brutal school of post-totalitarian politics – and not just judo) can knock you off-balance; and, finally, your excessive weight and faltering coordination will ground you.

I would recommend to Washington insiders that they carefully study Lukyanov’s piece and don’t waste their time on the remainder of this disappointing compendium.
_________________________________


By Vlad Ivanenko
PhD in economics from University of Western Ontario, Canada

American policy makers recognize that Putin is a judo master, but they are oblivious to the rules of this sport. "Resisting a more powerful opponent will result in your defeat,” says one of them, "whilst adjusting to and evading your opponent's attack will cause him to lose his balance … and you will defeat him.” If Washington paid attention to details, it would avoid applying its full weight on Moscow, for the fear of falling flat on its face.

In the competition of weight against evasion, weight wins if it manages to limit the maneuverability of its smaller but more agile opponent. The weight of international sanctions has meant restricting Russia’s flexibility in three critical areas: energy, banking, and the military sector. Is the USA succeeding on this front?

Russian trade statistics do not show any significant changes for August-September 2014. The total value of energy exports has decreased because of falling oil prices, but the total trade surplus has remained positive. Maybe the situation is worse for energy investment projects? Yes, Gazprom has shelved plans to expand LNG production (that would benefit the EU and Japan) and Exxon Mobil Corp. or BP PLC may not participate in oil projects in the Arctic or in shale oil in the Volga region. Yet, the situation is far from being critical. Western petroleum majors try to find ways to avoid sanctions, for example by insisting that they are searching for gas that is not sanctioned rather than for sanctioned oil though the two types of operations are indistinguishable. Moreover, the energy sanctions may even boost Russia’s long-forgotten goal of becoming an "energy superpower.” Up to now, such giants as Baker Hughes or Halliburton have monopolized the Russian petroleum service industry, but this time Moscow is obliged to raise the question of "naturalizing” their local units.

The sanctions applied to banking are not performing better. They have highlighted the fact that Visa or MasterCard process Russian transactions in centers overseas and Moscow is not pleased to be so closely monitored. It has ordered that the processing be localized, which would immunize about 90 percent of total banking operations against foreign interference. Washington may count on the remaining 10 percent that require trans-border transactions using SWIFT, but this victory may prove to be Pyrrhic in the long run. It prompts Russia to join forces with China to develop a comparable trans-border banking system.

The situation in the military sector is no better. While the US government tries to arrange the sale of Mistral warships to another customer, France balances on the border of indecency, postponing making the final decision on delivery of the first boat to Russia. Meanwhile, Moscow hints that it would not mind being compensated for the broken deal since it has already obtained the wanted know-how. (That mysterious new buyer has been warned of financial implications.)

In general, the sanctions create the impression that they are sabotaged by all parties. The EU had to compensate their meat and milk producers to the tune of 300 million Euros for losses due to Russian counter-sanctions, but it looks like Moscow opened the backdoor permitting the prohibited import via third countries (Belarus comes to mind as a plausible transit route as its foreign trade statistics is not reported separately from Russia.) This approach allows maintaining friendly relations with the EU and it appears that the latter returns the favor. Europe knows that, China and Latin America remain alert to the trade opportunities in Russia if its relations with Europe will really sour. In short, Washington has failed to limit the room for maneuver for Moscow in trade.

The US sanctions have unexpectedly succeeded in one unintended result: they put the spotlight on formerly invisible American "agents of influence” in Russia. Now, they have become colored like Gram-positive bacteria stained with aniline dye. For example, when former Vice Premier of Russia Boris Nemtsov opined that sanctions push Russia towards becoming a "Chinese colony,” the average Ivan or Masha ask immediately why Boris prefers seeing Russia as a "colony of the West” instead. The sanctions (or, more specifically, their precursor – the war in Ukraine) have consolidated Russian society to a degree not seen since 1945. People who are normally at each other's throats – from nationalists to communists – show astonishing consensus viewing the sanctions as an act of aggression. Now it is common for the former opponents of Putin’s regime to speak up against the US pressure and for grassroots NGOs to denounce funding from foreign governmental bodies. Even oligarchs, facing the stark choice to repatriate their "hard-earned” (in rigged privatization deals) capital or to risk losing it to the sanctions, feel obliged to pledge loyalty to their newfound motherland. Paradoxically, Washington has helped Moscow to gather in its lands and people.

If we look at the other side of tatami, western unity is hardly present. I have already mentioned that Paris and Berlin seem to be content at sabotaging the sanctions and for good cause. If Washington fails to bring Moscow to its knees, America’s frontrunners – most of all Berlin –are the ones who risk bearing the full brunt of animosities. Having spent the post-war time as an American ally, Germany increasingly favors neutrality instead of unwavering U.S. support in Washington's squabbles with Moscow.

The largest problem that Putin faces nowadays comes not from the West, but from the Ukrainian soil. The Putin’s concern has nothing to do with Washington meddling in that country’s political affairs. He should be sensitive to irrational behavior that the Russians of all stripes show from time to time. A Westerner will always misinterpret such behavior as "a riddle, wrapped in a mystery” when a Russian will immediately recognize the issue. The key to this riddle lies in the answer that the average Russian will find to the following question: Is Putin the RIGHT man for THIS job?

_________________________________

By Dmitry Babich
Political analyst at THE VOICE OF RUSSIA RADIO STATION

1. How do we imagine Russia can strike back at short term existential threats which the American scenario of "containment” sets out?

- We should not forget that the majority of Russian elite still wants the things to be back to square one, with relations and economic cooperation with the US and the EU restarted. This was the message which president Putin and the vast majority of the Russian political and business elite tried to get across during the recent international conference in Moscow, organized by the VTB bank and using the somewhat outdated headline slogan – "Russia Calling.” At the conference, Putin stressed that Russia’s search for new partners in South East Asia, Latin America and other regions does not mean Russia is going to shut its doors to the European Union or even to the US. The first vice-premier Igor Shuvalov, finance minister Siluanov and the chairwoman of the Central Bank, Elvira Nabiullina, - they all try to counteract the rumors about the possible limitations on free flow of capital to and from Russia. If Putin had been indeed intent on shutting the door to the West, he should have got rid of the Gaidar-style liberals – Siluanov, Nabiullina and especially the economic development minister Alexey Ulyukayev – long ago.

So, the Russian elite will start to act decisively only in the worst of cases – when harmful actions (not threats) from the West become truly existential. Arresting the foreign assets of individuals connected to Putin or conducting NATO’s exercises in the Baltic countries and even in Ukraine are not existential threats. The truly threatening actions might be the following ones: blocking to Russia its access to the international system of interbank transfers named SWIFT; provoking a dramatic fall in the oil prices (a non-dramatic fall is under way now); seizing Russian property abroad based on the outlandish rulings of the courts inside the EU (for example, $50 billion dollars in compensation to the former YUKOS owners, ruled on by a Dutch court). And even after such an escalation, turning against the US and the EU will be a gradual process for Russia. The first step might be giving power to the small minority of anti-globalist economic professionals in the current elite, such as Sergei Glazyev or Andrei Belousov (right now both are just economic advisers to president Putin, without any determined powers). The second step would include positive steps like switching the "money for oil” transactions between Russia and its partners in Europe and Asia to rubles and local currencies (the Chinese renminbi, in the first place). In that sense, Fyodor Lukyanov’s predictions of "aikido style” response from Russia are pretty realistic.

Can it ever come to the third stage (military action)? Hardly. Because even the second stage will mean enormous losses for the West (for the EU in the first place, but also for the US). An example: Russia’s exclusion from the SWIFT system will mean immediate stoppage of Russia’s oil and gas deliveries to the European Union (as Russia’s former liberal chairman of the Central Bank, Sergei Dubinin, put it, "no SWIFT means no money, and no money means no gas”).

2. Will Russia turn off the valves on gas deliveries to Germany?

No. Russia will stop supplying energy to Germany only in case Germany stops paying. However, there are many possible variants of "force majeure,” which may hamper Russian supplies to Germany. The Ukrainian government has been stealing gas from the pipelines leading to Germany even in much calmer times – beginning from the 1990s. So, why shouldn’t it do the same now? In 2009, when Ukraine under its then president Viktor Yushchenko siphoned off gas from the pipelines, countries of South-East Europe suffered, especially Bulgaria. But the Western media presented the whole affair as "Russia’s action against Europe and Ukraine” (Russia stopped supplying gas for Ukrainian needs in the first days of 2009, because Ukraine refused to pay its outstanding debt, so Ukraine took the gas destined for Europe). Will the EU choose to tell the truth now or will it stick with propaganda lies, as it did in the year 2009? I hope now even the EU bureaucrats will realize the stakes are too high now, after the civil war in Ukraine.

3. At what point can destructive economic warfare by the USA and the EU trigger a military response from Russia, such as a strike that ends up in the capture of Kiev?

- Russia will not be the side that starts military action. And of course Russia will not try to take Kiev as some sort of a reprisal for Western economic pressure. It is a clear and sad fact, that 25 years of anti-Russian propaganda (I have witnessed it back in 1990, still in Soviet times, during my visit to Kiev) – these years have transformed many of our brothers in Kiev beyond recognition. The Russian elite understands it and it realizes that trying to correct this tragic situation by force would be a fateful mistake. Years of dialogue and education will be needed. And if Russia is attacked by the NATO, it will target the attackers, not Ukraine.
_________________________________

Will Russia "Lift the Lamp”?
By Andrew Korybko

Andrew Korybko is the American Master’s Degree student at the Moscow State University of International Relations (MGIMO)

Thomas Graham’s piece in National Interest places all the emphasis on what the US can do to harm Russia, but pays no heed at all to what Russia can do in kind. In short, Moscow, which is not at all isolated, can cement its existing relationships to create and lead a center of anti-establishment (i.e. Western global hegemony) gravity that challenges the West in a multivectoral fashion. The following ideas are prefixed on the belief that the West-Russia opposition has crossed the Rubicon into uncharted territory, and that Russia will use this momentum to try to fulfill its grand strategic objective of a non-Western-dominated world. In no particular order, some suggestions are as follows:

* Take the Initiative: Instead of permanently being in a defensive position vis-à-vis NATO, Russia must take the initiative in building strategic partnerships (energy, economic, military, diplomatic, etc.) in states formerly thought of as being securely in the Western domain. It can start in Egypt, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Latin America, thereby applying the West’s policy of strategic encroachment into their own ‘backyard’. Wherever there are cracks in the Western-led international order, Russia should present itself as the attractive alternative, thereby wedging the gap even wider and weakening the entire Western structure.

* Deepen Existing Bilateral Partnerships: Russia can deepen its strategic partnership with China and work on formalizing one with Iran, with the former being global and the latter being in the West’s most vulnerable theater. A Russian-Iranian strategic partnership would extend beyond Caspian and nuclear energy issues and see implicit cooperation between the two in the Mideast, especially in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. It can even carry over into Afghanistan after the NATO drawdown by year’s end.

* Expand Multilateral Activity: BRICS could be expanded to include the MINT countries, thus furthering the organization’s scope and creating opportunities for a long-term strategic ‘flip’ of those states from their largely Western orientations. The SCO is already enlarging with the forthcoming admission of India and Pakistan, so this will present many more unforeseen advantages for Russia’s foreign and economic policies. Russia should support integrating its multilateral partnerships even further, as the interests of these organizations and their members largely coincide with Russian foreign policy.

* Solidify New Trade Networks: The rush that non-Western countries were in to fill Russia’s counter-sanction agricultural void testifies to the interest that many states have in penetrating the Russian market. Moscow can use this, and every other counter-sanction, to help build an alternative non-Western-centric trade network that can bolster Russia’s complex economic interdependence with other states. This would give it the opportunity to expand mutual relations beyond the economic sphere and perhaps eventually associate these states into the multilateral webs of BRICS and the SCO.

* Be the Bridge: Russia has the geostrategic opportunity of being an air, land, and sea bridge between Europe and East Asia. In line with China’s Silk Road and New Eurasian Land Bridge projects, the concept of the Northern Sea Route, and international air routes traversing Siberia, Russia can use its geographic position to reap the resultant dividends of East-West trade and thereby increasing its middleman importance. In the case of air travel, it can also prohibit American military overflight from Afghanistan and sanction Western air carriers.

* Play the Devil’s Advocate: The EU is rife with both left- and right-leaning groups that preach a form of ‘Euroscepticism’ that endangers the current Atlanticist establishment. Whether or not they are explicitly Russian-friendly, their existence, such as that of the UKIP and the National Front, sends quivers down the Eurocrats’ spine. Moscow can use its information channels to provide implicit support for these movements and their supporters, thereby irking the West in the same manner that it does Moscow through its support of Navalny and others.

Conclusively, by following the above-mentioned policies, Russia would ironically be harkening back to the words that Emma Lazarus inscribed on the Statue of Liberty, albeit addressing the non-West and those within it who are dissatisfied with its global dominance:

"Give me your tired, your poor,

Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,

The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.

Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed, to me:

I lift my lamp beside the golden door.”

So for Western leaders, the question shouldn’t be "What can we do to Russia?”, but rather, "Will Russia lift the lamp?”

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Russia-West Relations: A Basis For Cautious Optimism
By Michael Averko

New York based independent foreign policy analyst and media critic

All things considered, the Russian government has weathered the geopolitical storm quite well. This has been done in a confident manner, which conforms with present and likely future realities.

With other options in the global economy, combined with Russia's own ability, Russia-West trade relations aren't the one way street as some suggest. Besides dealing with themselves, Russia and the West each have other geopolitical concerns to ponder - issues that have some convergence of interest between the two.

Practically speaking, there're limits to what Russia and the West can and can't do. Post-Soviet Russia during Putin's leadership reveals a clear understanding of this situation. On a related note, it's ironic how some believe that the Kremlin has been pursuing a zero sum game stance.

Prior to the overthrow of Ukraine's democratically elected, albeit imperfect president Viktor Yanukovych, the Russian and Ukrainian governments sought three way (Russian, EU and Ukrainian) talks on how to best develop Ukraine. In contrast, the EU and the Obama administration pursued an all or nothing approach, which disregarded the counter-Euromaidan perspective in Ukraine. Yanukovych's overthrow contradicted the internationally brokered power sharing agreement, on how Ukraine would be governed for the remainder of this year. The coup in Kiev led to a series of enhanced anti-Russian activity, that prompted a counter-response from many in the territory of the former Ukrainian SSR.

Had a reasonable course of political action been pursued in Kiev, Crimea might very well still be a part of Ukraine. As is, Moscow has ample reason to feel well premised about Crimea's reunification with Russia.

For the time being, it looks like the situation in the Donetsk and Lugansk areas of eastern Ukraine could be in a prolonged frozen conflict status. The Kiev regime has been unable to have its way there. Simultaneously, there's the probability that this part of eastern Ukraine will not achieve a formally recognized independence from Russia, or an offer to become a part of that country. Russia has good reason to not risk getting so entangled in a prolonged messy setting. At the same time, the Kremlin can't be too passive to a nearby unstable condition, that can create increased (economic and other) problems for Russia.

Outside Donetsk and Lugansk, the rest of Ukraine remains problematical. It's not in the interests of Russia or the West to see things in that former Soviet republic get too chaotic. Hopefully, Ukraine itself can eventually see a rise in a better political outlook - one that can successfully balance the different historical, cultural and geopolitical preferences in that former Soviet republic. Russia and the West can't be completely blamed for the imperfections in Ukraine.

Put mildly, the Russian economy isn't in as dire straits as Ukraine's. I'd be no surprise to see this difference become even more evident in the coming months. In the foreseeable future, the relationship between Russia and the West will continue to have up and down trends. As time progresses, there will be added examples to review and analyze, for further guidance on how to best proceed.

When things heat up, expect the usual suspects to advocate a more confrontational approach.

On the subject of hypothetical future occurrences, we're IMHO distant from the aforementioned scenario (brought up in the introduction to this panel discussion) of a Russian military presence in Kiev. For now, there seems to be enough of a Russia-West understanding to limit the chance for that move. On a somewhat related aside, the former Supreme NATO Commander of Europe, Wesley Clark, recently came out against the idea of Ukraine joining NATO. As a frequent geopolitical commentator, Clark isn't known for being sympathetic to pro-Russian interests.

In any event, Russia's military entry into Kiev would face greater opposition, when compared to the more pro-Russian parts of the former Ukrainian SSR. Since the end of WW II, that city has experienced a noticeable migration of people from the not so pro-Russian areas of Galicia and Volhynia. The Kiev regime still has sway over Odessa and Kharkov, which are more pro-Russian than the Ukrainian capital.

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Short and to the point
By Charles Bausman, editor Russia Insider

1. I think Russia is far less vulnerable to US bullying than people like Graham realize. Russia simply too big and too connected with other countries to be bullied like Iraq, Libya, or Yugoslavia. So far the bullying is just blowing up in Washington’s face. Russia is actually benefiting from it, economically and otherwise.

2. Russia’s strongest counter-weapon is information.Instead of thinking in terms of military muscle and economic clout, (although these are essential and important), Russia should be putting more effort into winning over hearts and minds in the West through media. Ultimately this is more valuable than the biggest of defense budgets or largest of economies.

Regarding the bullying:

Efforts to force Russia to adhere to Washington’s wishes have been so far, and will continue to be, a spectacular failure.

The proxy war initiated by Kiev has ended in resounding defeat. The Russia-hostile government in Kiev is tottering on the verge of collapse. Economic sanctions have had little effect, and in many ways are helping Russia.

Honestly, I think the Russians can hardly believe their good luck. Everything seems to be going their way on this. Whatever Washington tries ends up backfiring.

Regarding the information battle:

The world media landscape is very different today than it was even in 2008 when the Georgian war happened, and has changed beyond recognition since Iraq and Yugoslavia. Information now crosses national borders with ease, and it is much harder to enforce a certain line in national media.

In the information wars regarding Russian issues, the West is spectacularly vulnerable, because their media have wandered so far from the objective truth, that it is child’s play to shoot down the nonsense.

That is a lot of what we do at Russia Insider. We’ve also thought a lot about why Western media has failed its readers so miserably, and understand how it happened, and understand how realistic it is to influence what the western media says.
_________________________________

Originally published at: 
us-russia.org/2728-thinking-about-the-unthinkable-what-comes-next-in-the-new-cold-war.

All statements in this report are an opinion of the author(s). Act at your own risk. Russia & America Goodwill Association (RAGA) is not responsible for the content of the article. Any views or opinions presented in this report are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of RAGA. Any liability in respect to this communication remain with the author.

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Note: originally published in December of 2013
 
Kauffmann’s op-ed essay shows that she deals in platitudes and makes foolhardy mistakes of fact and interpretation which, due to her august position in mainstream media, few if any call out.  In this brief critique, I will break that silence…

By their calling, journalists should be diligent, hard-working folks. After all, they are by and large generalists  with a gift for writing and/or speaking who are called upon to deal with any and all subjects, who are dispatched to the four corners of the globe to cover breaking news and must get into the core facts with great speed.

However, by her past performance and by her op-ed page contribution to The International New York Times this week, the former editor-in-chief of Le Monde and its current editorial director has demonstrated that hard work is not her forte.

In this connection I am obliged to point out that Kauffmann’s mental laziness and preference to talk rather than listen first came to my attention in March 2012 when she, together with the editors-in-chief of five other leading world newspapers, took part in a round-table meeting in Novo Ogarevo with then presidential candidate Vladimir Putin just days before the Russian election.¹ They were expected to discuss the points in a 14 page campaign manifesto entitled “Russia and a Changing World” which Putin had just published. Instead they lectured Putin on democracy.

In her article about the event, “In Putin’s Dacha,’ appearing in Le Monde a week later, Kauffmann denounced the Russian position paper as ‘a diatribe.’ However, from the 38 page transcript of the meeting which was published on Putin’s website, it is plain that Kauffmann, like 4 of the other 5 editors, never bothered to read Putin’s 14 pages on the way to the meeting. The only diligent soul was the Japanese editor of Asahi Shimbun. And Kauffmann used her 5 minutes in direct contact with Russia’s top politician to badger Putin on why Russia did not force Syria’s President Assad to release a wounded French journalist then being held hostage. It took Putin to explain that the lady journalist was actually being held not by Syrian state forces but by the rebels, who were refusing to hand her over to a waiting Russian helicopter crew.

Kauffmann’s latest op-ed essay shows that she continues to deal in platitudes, to serve up conventional wisdom and to make foolhardy mistakes of fact and interpretation which, due to her august position in mainstream media, few if any call out.  In the following brief critique, I will break that silence: the queen of the French print media is stark naked. And this is all the more to be rued because she has chosen to address one of the key questions of international relations in our day: how to interrelate with rising Russia.

Sylvie Kauffmann strikes a moderate, above-the-fray pose in her essay on the recent European diplomatic fiasco in relations with Ukraine. From the very start, she seeks to minimize the nature of Europe’s defeat by putting her American audience on the defensive and issuing them a put-down that may be well received among intellectual snobs in the Times readership but in no way exculpates Europe for its own grievous obtuseness in handling Russia.

Kauffmann calls to mind President George Bush’s ‘Chicken Kiev” speech of 1991 to demonstrate how wrongly American leaders can read the situation on the ground in far-off places.  That Bush erred is undisputable, however, his calculations (concern over nuclear proliferation if the Soviet Union broke up) were graver and deserve greater respect that Kauffmann deals him.

Then with typical Parisian hauteur she notes the antics on Kyiv’s Independence Square last week by Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland and Senator John McCain. Yes, Kauffmann is right: both revealed the American predisposition to reach into the Cold War toolbox to deal with every new development in relations with the East. However, she fails to mention that European politicians were equally keen to mingle with pro-Europe demonstrators in Kyiv and pose for photo opportunities, among them a delegation from the European People’s Party in the European Parliament and the Foreign Minister of Germany, Guido Westerwelle. Such grandstanding is cheap politics and unhelpful meddling in the internal affairs of a sovereign state, whether practiced by Americans or Europeans.

Kauffmann tells us Europe has superior savoir-faire with regard to Russia arising from its new Member States in the East: “Today, some of the younger members – Sweden Poland, Lithuania – are important players in this drama, bringing new expertise to Brussels.” In this connection she cites in particular the Czech EU Commissioner for enlargement Stefan Fule and the Polish diplomat Jan Tombinski, the EU ambassador to Kyiv. They and others with in-depth experience constitute a ‘new Europe’ that is ‘already bringing East and West together.”

There are grievous flaws in logic and in fact in these assertions. First, on the logic side, we may say that the proof is always in the pudding. What counts is the outcome, which in the case of Ukraine’s decision against signing the political and economic agreements with the EU at the end of November was a pure disaster for the policy set by Brussels. Kauffmann herself quotes Aleksander Kwasniewski to the effect that “Brussels was naïve.” That puts in question the expertise and political wisdom of the EU team.

Moreover, in the broader sense the New Europe, including Sweden, is precisely part of the problem, not the solution to relations with Russia. Poland, Lithuania and Sweden all have contested control of East Central Europe with Russia going back to the 17th century. On the Old Continent, all political elites have excellent historical memories. And while Poland and Sweden have in the past few years found an accommodation with Moscow and resolved issues of mutual interest, Lithuania and its sister Member States in the Baltics have continued up to the present to lead the charge against Russia and for many years now have frustrated the conclusion of a new strategic agreement at the EU level.

Now for the most inexplicable error of facts:  Kaufmann suggests that Ukraine’s signing the EU documents will be good for its economy, which can then be expected to grow as has Poland’s since its accession. Poland now has a per capita GDP which is 3 times higher than Ukraine’s. She goes on: “If, one day, the Ukrainians catch up with the Poles, their Russian counterparts will take note.”  Sadly, Mme. Kauffmann did not bother to take two minutes to consult Wikipedia on per capita GDP in the world. Had she done so, she would find that in 2012 Russia ranked number 47 in the world with $14,302 while Poland was number 55, with $12,709.

That blunder is emblematic of her closed mind to new information. Sylvie Kauffmann is, simply put, too full of herself, too complacent to be an intellectual leader. Her own flag waving for Europe is not at all dissimilar from Reagan’s image of America as a beacon, a light on the hill. Per Kauffmann, Europe means “rule of law, government without corruption and solidarity.” Starting from a low base, like all of the post-Soviet states, Russia today is trying hard to tackle those three issues, with greater or lesser success. Meanwhile Europe, with an acknowledged ‘democracy deficit’ that the sovereign debt crisis and austerity have highlighted, is still sitting on its laurels.  At a university conference in Brussels last week, experts from the local chapter of Transparency International and the International Chamber of Commerce revealed that a seemingly whistle-clean country like Belgium, ranking 15th in the TI ratings per perceived corruption (Russia is 127th) holds the position chiefly because of the opaqueness of its public services.²

Most importantly, and revelatory of her idealist turn of mind, Kaufmann leaves current money matters for the very last paragraph in her essay. She notes that Vladimir Putin offered to Ukraine $15 billion in loans and discounted natural gas, which she calls ‘a big fish.’  Her belief that Europe’s offering instead to ‘teach Ukraine how to fish for itself’ does not stand up to any scrutiny when she is addressing a country in recession, a country which has exhausted its hard currency reserves and is at the brink of default.

It is regrettable that the op-ed page of the International New York Times has no fact or logic checks on the essays it publishes so long as the basic message is in line with the editorial stance of the paper itself. The exclusive showcasing of like-minded authors is not a credit to the paper’s management or an encouragement to its readership to think for themselves.

1) http://usforeignpolicy.blogs.lalibre.be/archive/2012/03/04/russia-votes-4-march-2012-the-information-war.html
2)This will be the subject of a separate analytical essay in the coming week

© Gilbert Doctorow, 2014
      
G. Doctorow is an occasional guest lecturer at St. Petersburg State University and Research Fellow of the American University in Moscow. His latest book, Stepping Out of Line: Collected (Nonconformist) Essays on Russian-American Relations, 2008-12, is available in paperback and e-book from Amazon.com and affiliated websites worldwide.

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