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Stratfor’s George Friedman and Realism in American Foreign Policy

1/31/2015

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PictureBy Gilbert Doctorow, Ph.D.
It would be very reassuring if the President, John Kerry, Samantha Power and Susan Rice spoke like George Friedman.  However, they do not and this is one of the reasons we are heading into uncharted territory with unforeseeable consequences. Read on...

George Friedman’s December 2014 interview with the Kommersant newspaper in Moscow, republished in English on Russia-Insider and other alternative media, has attracted considerable attention among pundits. The founder and CEO of Strategic Forecasting Inc., or Stratfor, an information and analysis service, made a number of remarkable assertions on the origins of the present confrontation with Russia over Ukraine which the chatting classes simply could not ignore.

Among the gems, we find Friedman’s matter-of-fact statement that the United States was behind the coup d’etat of February 21, 2014 which overthrew the democratically elected government of Viktor Yanukovich and brought to power the extreme nationalists and pro-Western forces of the Maidan. He tells us that in doing so the United States was merely looking after its national interests and serving its hundred-year-old policy of preventing any nation from becoming a hegemonic power on the European continent, which Russia was showing a potential and an intention to achieve.

The origin of U.S. misgivings over Russia, the determination that Russia had to be contained or disrupted or distracted by new security threats Friedman identifies with the Syrian conflict a couple of years ago,  when Russia demonstrated it was capable of exerting significant influence and acting contrary to American plans in the Middle East, an area of strategic importance.

His reputation for heading a “Shadow CIA” (Barron’s description of Stratfor) made Friedman’s stress on Realpolitik drivers for U.S. foreign policy appear to be the voice of Washington, telling us the real story of what is going on.

In Friedman’s analysis, there is no personal dimension.  Obama is bound hand and foot; he is doing what any American president would have to do in the face of rising Russia.  There is no “Tsar Putin,” no “mafia state.”  Instead Friedman says simply:  “It's a matter of the fundamental divergence of the national interests of two great powers.”

Friedman’s statements are all the more intriguing to commentators on Russian-American relations, because they run roughly in parallel with the explanations of the conflict which that consummate practitioner of Realpolitik, Vladimir Putin, gave repeatedly in his major public appearances from October to December last year.

The problem with taking Friedman as the ultimate insider is that what he is saying runs smack into the conventional wisdom of the chief actors in Washington responsible for formulating and approving our foreign policy, as well as for explaining it to the nation:  the President, the presidential administration, the Secretary of State and his assistants, the U.S. Senate. That wisdom states flatly that Realpolitik, balance of power thinking are shop-worn remnants of the 19th and early 20th centuries. In this view, we have moved on to values-based foreign policy, otherwise known as Idealism or Liberalism.

This dogma was so entrenched that when the Russians made their move in the spring of 2014 to change European borders ‘by force’ (if we believe the Washington narrative) and take back Crimea, it sparked a debate among the court philosophers of our foreign policy establishment. Was Realpolitik making a comeback and putting in question the End of History beliefs of the Neoconservatives, the key promoters of Idealism?

In his contribution to the debate set out by Foreign Affairsmagazine in its May-June issue - “The Return of Geopolitics” – Princeton professor G. John Ikenberry reminded us that the global architecture of financial, defense and other liberal institutions that the U.S. put in place at the start of the Cold War had continued to build out after the Cold War ended. They managed geopolitics as designed, maintained the American empire even if this was not understood by Francis Fukuyama’s followers, who saw a conflict-free future now that ideology-based conflicts had been resolved once and for all.

However, the September-October issue of FA carried an article by University of Chicago professor John Mearsheimer (“Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault.”) in which Liberalism/Idealism is described  as ideological blinkers of our political leadership that led us to misjudge the Russians on NATO and cross their red lines, leading to the present confrontation.

In the rebuttal to Mearsheimer in the November-December issue ofFA, Michael McFaul denounces Realpolitik generally, while Stephen Sestanovich claims that the US, like Russia, is not a pure play in its foreign policy, and that it follows national interest, meaning old-fashioned power politics, even if it talks a Liberal policy line.

What are we to make of this? 

It raises the question of who really is in control of U.S. foreign policy.  Is it the silent minority who believe in an interest-based policy, or is it the voluble majority who insist that democratic, free market values must drive policy, that peaceful relations are only possible between states that the U.S. qualifies as democratic and that other regimes must be overthrown.

And why does this matter? It is important because the Realist school, by its nature, looks for compromises in a context of ever changing alignments between states, whereas Idealism, with its emphasis on universal values, leaves no room for compromise and flux.

It would be very reassuring if the President, John Kerry, Samantha Power and Susan Rice spoke like George Friedman.  However, they do not, and this is one of the reasons why serious observers of the present confrontation like Mikhail Gorbachev are expressing alarm over the possibility of the present Cold War moving into new directions, namely a hot war between the U.S. and Russia, with unforeseeable and possibly catastrophic consequences.


G. Doctorow is an occasional guest lecturer at St. Petersburg State University and Research Fellow of the American University in Moscow. His latest book, Stepping Out of Line: Collected (Nonconformist) Essays on Russian-American Relations, 2008-12, is available in paperback and e-book from Amazon.com and affiliated websites worldwide.

All statements in this report are an opinion of the author. Act at your own risk. Russia & America Goodwill Association (RAGA) is not responsible for the content of the article. Any views or opinions presented in this report are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of RAGA. Any liability in respect to this communication remain with the author.

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Chancellor Angela Merkel and Mitteleuropa, or why Germany is as responsible for the growing disaster in Ukraine as the USA

1/27/2015

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Pictureby Gilbert Doctorow, Ph.D.
Contrary to the widely held view among political commentators, Angela Merkel is not doing Obama's bidding on sanctions against Russia over Ukraine. She has her own policy which just happens to overlap with US policy in the region in some respects. This new German foreign policy is loaded with potential problems not only for Russia but for the EU and for the United States. Read on…

If something makes no sense in international affairs, then it is best to step back and try to get your mind around it from a totally different angle. It is safe to assume that there is a logical explanation, just coming from a different logic which we must apply ourselves to discern.

For at least six months, I have been trying to fathom Angela Merkel’s policy on Russia. Finally, the Eureka moment has arrived. I found the keyhole, inserted my key and the door opened. Now I am ready to share my insights, so please take a seat and let’s see if we agree.

Let us recall for a moment that in the spring of 2014, following the coup d’etat in Kiev that brought to power the radical nationalists of the Maidan movement, and soon after the Russian response became clear and the fate of Crimea hung in the balance, the consensus of political commentators was that Angela Merkel would be the honest broker reconciling Russia and the United States. As an Ossie, as a Russian speaker, she was said to have a special relationship with Vladimir Putin and could find solutions to patch things up like no one else.

However, with the passage of time, Frau Merkel emerged as the leading force on the Continent working against Putin and Russia. She was the one who declared early on that Putin was living in another reality, hinting at his being delusional. And her most recent statements keep up the unrelenting personal attacks on the Russian president: a week ago she explained to the press that Putin would not be invited to the G-7 on her watch, because the Russian ‘does not share our values.’

In between these pokes in the eye of her Russian colleague, Merkel has insisted on tough sanctions.

By December 2014, dissent in the German ranks found coverage in the press. We read the Open Letter of Germany’s great and good who denounced Merkel’s Ost Politik. We read the harsh critique of the sanctions by Matthias Platzeck, head of the business lobby German-Russian Forum, and former party chief of the SPD (Social Democrats), Merkel’s coalition partners.

Other observers may be equally puzzled over how and why Chancellor Merkel persists in Russia-bashing but they have not let on, instead declaring with certitude that Merkel was and remains ‘clueless.’ Indeed, for a time I was persuaded that only American blackmail could explain the behavior of the Chancellor, which seemed to so flagrantly contradict the interests of her party and her nation,  Russia’s biggest trading partner in Europe, where 300,000 jobs depend on doing business with Russia. Why other than under duress would she be doing Obama’s bidding and promoting sanctions that harm German business interests in Russia which took decades to develop? Had the American espionage of her phones uncovered some extremely damaging kompromat about her sexual orientation or about family ties to the Stasi? Speculation fed speculation.

But in the end, I am satisfied that the conundrum of Merkel's position has been clarified and that there are no dirty little secrets here, only a definition of the German national interest that is not reflected in any way in public statements by the Chancellor or by other leading politicians.

I believe that Merkel is not doing Obama's bidding on sanctions. She has her own policy which just happens to overlap with US policy in the region in some respects. She is indeed working against the interests of part of the German business community, including some major firms. But at the same time she is serving the interests of another part of German business which may be politically more important to her.

And who might Merkel’s allies on her Russian policy among German businessmen be?  I freely acknowledge that my guess is based on anecdotal evidence; but it is firsthand, rather than hearsay, and  I am persuaded of its qualitative value.

One of the most concrete cases that comes to mind dates from the summer of 2013. I happened to attend a high society engagement party in downtown Brussels which was multi-cultural, indeed multi-civilizational since the prospective groom was an EU Commission legal officer of German nationality, a long- time resident of Belgium, and the bride was Chinese from an outlying province of the PRC. At the banquet, I was seated next to a friend of the groom, a German industrialist in the metalworking sector who has long owned his primary factory near Antwerp and then several years ago opened another works in Poland just across the border from Germany. 

Over appetizers, he was boasting about this Polish operation, about how the unusually well trained workers are so grateful for salaries that German peers consider a pittance and about how there is no organized labor to deal with, no labor disputes in Poland.  I asked whether he had any thoughts of looking for production facilities still further to the East, namely in Russia, where costs could be still more attractive. He dismissed the idea of investing in Russia with disdain. Russians were crooks, in his opinion, with whom you could not do business.

 A bit further into the meal,  the conversation at our table turned to the then ongoing banking crisis in Cyprus and the very novel decision to perform a haircut not on bond holders but on depositors, the so-called ‘bail-in.’ My German industrialist expressed his delight with this solution, since he fully expected those most adversely affected to be Russians, whose capital in Cyprus had to be illegal proceeds of money laundering. Others at the table chimed in with their hearty agreement.

That constellation of opinions was striking, but seemed peculiar and irrelevant at the time. However, In the perspective of current German foreign policy, it appears highly illuminating. 

In the past few years, there has been a great deal of talk in Western business media about the Polish economic success story, how Poland was virtually the only EU country not to suffer recession in the wake of the 2008 global financial meltdown. The relative high Polish per capita GDP is widely cited and has been held out to Ukraine as an example of what awaited it upon signing the Association Agreement with the EU.  However, no one stops to mention the structure of the Polish economy, which is heavily dependent on foreign owned plant from which it supplies bits and pieces of industrial products. Meanwhile purely Polish enterprises are just subcontractors for similar bits and pieces exported to Germany. Complete cycle production is rare. No one bothers to ask why there is not a single international Polish brand you can name.

The situation is not dissimilar in the Czech Republic, Mitteleuropa’s other great industrial nation, where the economy has also been colonized, chiefly by German manufacturers, though companies like Volkswagen have established full cycle production there.

These are the success stories.  Bulgaria, Romania and the other losers among the new EU members have seen their Soviet period industry swept away without any replacement.

While the fact of large-scale and unceasing Polish emigration has emerged in recent investigative reporting by The Financial Times, the situation is even worse in the weaker economies of Eastern and Southeastern Europe. With its strong drawing power as a vibrant economy, Germany is a major beneficiary of the cheap labor of these new Gastarbeiters, who, unlike the Turkish immigrants of the more distant past, pose no religious or ethnic challenges whatsoever to the German majority.

By its economic policy among its Eastern neighbors, Germany is fulfilling the pre-WWI dream of Mitteleuropa -  a German dominated Central and Eastern Europe.In the domain of diplomacy, commentators have for some time spoken of Germany finding its voice and taking a more active role in international affairs. However, there has very little discussion of what that means.

It is common knowledge that the European Economic Community, and after that the European Union, was built on a Franco-German tandem. The difference in economic might of the partners was apparent from the very beginning. What France brought to the partnership was international acceptability which Germany, with its dark past of Nazism, sorely lacked.  Now Germany has outgrown these constraints and has stepped out from behind the French screen. The policy it is pursuing would do Bismarck proud, indeed might win plaudits from Wilhelm II.

The keystone of this policy is profound accommodation with Germany’s largest and most ambitious neighbor, Poland. Whereas under the resentful Kaczynski brothers at the start of the new millennium, relations with Poland were fraught, Frau Merkel has flattered and cajoled their successors into joining the German bandwagon. Hence her backing for the appointment of Polish President Donald Tusk to the post of Council president notwithstanding his provocative positions on Russia and his exceedingly modest qualifications for the job, beginning with his poor linguistic skills in a position that is all about communication.

From the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, indeed in the couple of years prior to the November 2013 showdown with Yanukovich over the Association Agreement, Merkel let the Poles and Lithuanians run with Ukraine as fast and far as they could, even as they committed one terrible blunder after another.  The net result is that she has the Poles eating out of her hand, the Lithuanians eating out of her hand, and the Baltics lining up at her side.

In this configuration, the ever-vain Polish political class is finally realizing its dream of replacing France as the number 2 power in Europe. Russia is no longer a strategic partner for Germany. Meanwhile the PIGS of southern Europe are Untermenschen if ever there were any. 

The content of the EU is being changed right under our noses, but everyone's eyes are looking elsewhere, to the familiar landscape - to the European Central Bank and Quantitative Easing, to the job creating 315 billion of Commission President Juncker . 

I think we have all underestimated Merkel, who mumbles through undistinguished speeches when she appears on the international stage. We have overestimated her peers.

We have also overestimated the extent of US villainy in the Ukraine affair.  It takes more than one superpower to create a mess of the dimensions of Ukraine today.  Berlin is crucially important in the sanctions policy against Russia and in the confrontation over Ukraine generally.

As for France, they have earned the contempt of the Germans by their own consistent efforts over the past twenty years.  When Germany went into austerity at the start of the millennium, Socialist France enacted its 35 hour work week and other self-destructive policies that set its economy ever farther back from the Germans. France allowed itself to be lured by the US into an imperial role and white man's burden sharing in Africa and the Middle East.  Germany kept its own counsel and focused on concentrating its power in Europe.  Now we see the consequences of this divergence.  France is completely marginalized even if President Hollande thinks that the Charlie Hebdo march put Paris back at the center of the universe.

The UK continues to contemplate it belly button, or to be more precise, nurses its ideological pique over the overregulated, over-spending European Union, focusing instead on its mythical special relationship with the USA to give it global clout. Should there be a British exit from the Union, then that special relationship will be in tatters as the UK will have outlived its usefulness to Washington in managing the Old World.  Still more tragically, with Britain withdrawing from Continental governance and France pursuing imperial dreams in the greater world, every element of the German foreign policy objectives from Bismarck through Wilhelm II will have been achieved. This is surely a terrific way to mark the centenary of WWI.

Meanwhile, in the US foreign policy establishment, there are no doubt many who are rubbing their hands in glee over Frau Merkel’s leadership of an anti-Russian coalition in the EU that has so far succeeded in putting in place cruel sanctions that match the US intentions. What they have not asked themselves is why she is so accommodating and what the new Germany means for American control of the Continent, which becomes very problematic the more Germany consolidates its neocolonial rule.  After all, American foreign policy over the last 50 years or more has been built on preventing any power from challenging its own hegemony on the Eurasian continent.


G. Doctorow is an occasional guest lecturer at St. Petersburg State University and Research Fellow of the American University in Moscow. His latest book, Stepping Out of Line: Collected (Nonconformist) Essays on Russian-American Relations, 2008-12, is available in paperback and e-book from Amazon.com and affiliated websites worldwide.

All statements in this report are an opinion of the author. Act at your own risk. Russia & America Goodwill Association (RAGA) is not responsible for the content of the article. Any views or opinions presented in this report are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of RAGA. Any liability in respect to this communication remain with the author.


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Putin, the Public Speaker - by Gilbert Doctorow, Ph.D.

1/20/2015

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Pictureby Gilbert Doctorow, Ph.D.
Putin’s most important speech in terms of conceptualizing Russian foreign policy was his appearance at Sochi. The speech was on the level of his talk to the Munich Security Conference in February 2007, pushing out the frontiers of openness and explicitness in identifying forces at work in the New World Order. Read on…

Regular readers of my periodic essays, and more especially those who have read Stepping Out of Line will have noticed that I stopped commenting on Vladimir Putin’s speeches early in 2014, whereas in the past his appearances on the world stage almost inevitably drew my close analysis.

In good part, this is due to my overarching interest in writing about what others ignore.  Until very recently, the content of Putin’s speeches got scant attention in the media, both mainstream and alternative media. However, as relations between Russia and the West became very tense, as commentators of all political persuasions agreed that a new Cold War is settling in, Putin’s public speeches have been combed over for signs of what comes next. Finally, some commentators on the anti-Washington Consensus side of the aisle began analyzing his unique style of delivery as well. I think in particular of a couple of very fine essays published by Alexander Mercouris in recent weeks.

For these reasons, both finally to get out of my desk drawer my views on three major public events at which Vladimir Putin held forth since October and to enter the discussion on his inimitable style, I offer the following remarks.

The three events in question are his speech to the Valdai Discussion Club in Sochi on 24 October, his annual Address to the Federal Assembly on 4 December and his annual Press Conference held two weeks later, on 18 December.  The content and setting of the three varied, and so did the way the President handled himself.

The most important speech in terms of conceptualizing Russian foreign policy was his appearance at Sochi. The speech was on the level of his talk to the Munich Security Conference in February 2007, pushing out the frontiers of openness and explicitness in identifying forces at work in the New World Order dating from the collapse of the Soviet Union and describing how Russia intends to stand its ground and defend its interests.

The audience included a large contingent of foreign experts on Russia who are highly critical of the Kremlin, as has become traditional for the Valdai Discussion Club events. However, the real audience was not in the room. In effect, the speech was directed at Washington and at the world, if I may paraphrase the terminology of papal addresses. Catching it on the fly was not important. The written text would be parsed by think tank analysts in the following days.

Thus, it is no accident that in Sochi Putin read his speech from start to finish, barely raising his head from the pages. Those who remark how he does not use a teleprompter fail to say that when Putin reads, he reads and makes no effort to conceal that; it is a political statement in its own right.

Putin had no desire to add any last minute thoughts, to depart from what had been polished and to risk being misunderstood. Indeed, he crammed so much into the speech that if read at a normal pace he would have exceeded by far the planned time. He read perhaps 10% too fast, missing rhetorical points, stumbling from time to time in most uncharacteristic manner. 

Putin also read his speech to the Federal Assembly, shuffling papers as he went along. But he spoke at a leisurely pace, taking his time to collect applause and showing no stress. His address dealt with a mixture of foreign and domestic subjects.  The event was conducted like a meeting among friends.

The Press Conference stands apart precisely because after his brief introductory remarks the President responded to questions extemporaneously, without prepared notes, armed only with pad and pencil. And the context could not have been more daunting: the conference, which took place in a vast auditorium with more than 1200 foreign and domestic journalists in attendance, came the day after one of the sharpest falls in the ruble exchange rate and in the Moscow stock market since the onset of the economic crisis of 1998.  

The Russian journalists in the hall were a very mixed group, ranging from the Kremlin press pool, a body of loyalists who were given the first word, to regional boosters who flock to this annual event to get in a good word for their home towns and speak about the President’s past or hoped-for future visits. It extended to determined foes of the ‘regime’ like Ksenia Sobchak, who used the microphone to denounce the Kremlin leadership at every turn. The foreign press was heavily skewed to those known for their anti-Kremlin position. Thus, journalists for the BBC and The Financial Times were able to pose hostile, at times nearly insulting questions implying the President’s culpability for the unfolding economic crisis or directly accusing Russia of military aggressiveness. Each and every question was answered with civility, clarity and, at times, humor, which was either self-deprecatory or ironic depending on the questioner.

Alexander Mercouris and other pundits have wondered aloud, who else among world leaders would dare do the same? The obvious answer is no one.  To drive home the point, one need only consider the year-end press conference of Barack Obama the next day, which was allotted a fraction of the time and took place in a room with just 60 or so handpicked journalists.

The end result is that Putin came across not merely as a statesman who has mastered the issues before his nation but as a natural as opposed to synthetic politician who is manipulated by polls and by his entourage.

Let us now turn from method of delivery to content.

As I mentioned, the Valdai Discussion group speech in Sochi was one of the most important foreign policy addresses of Putin’s fifteen years at the apex of the Russian political system. It expanded directly on themes he first set out in his February 2007 speech to the Munich Security Conference. But whereas the Munich speech was a recitation of stored up resentments and focused on how U.S. and Western behavior after the collapse of the Soviet Union was unfair, unreasonable in its treatment of Russia, failing to take into account its national interests, the speech at Sochi examines in detail the consequences of American unilateralism and global hegemony for the world at large.

Putin raises the question whether his and other countries should not merely sit back and let America take the lead in global management, let America bear the cost of maintaining the New World Order and enjoy the fruits of the Pax Americana.  His answer is a resounding ‘no,’ as he points to the broad swathe of chaos that has resulted from American-led interventions in Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan and to the succession of unforeseen critical challenges wherever the USA has fomented or encouraged color revolutions, most recently culminating in the Ukrainian civil war.

The speech expresses disappointment that his warnings of seven years ago went unheeded by the United States and its nominal allies, in reality vassals, who have systematically undermined international law and international organizations that stood in the way of their plans for regime change and transformation of whole regions in their own image. The result is a world convulsed by artificially induced changes, a proliferation of contradictions in the international arena which can no longer be controlled by the institutions set up after the Second World War or by the Helsinki process of the 1970s. The risk is regional hot wars if not a new global conflagration in a world without rules.

In this depressing context, the current impasse between the West and Russia over Ukraine is part of a much bigger problem, and the importance of any given elements in the crisis must not be exaggerated. The message here is one that Vladimir Putin would carry into his later appearances on 4 and 18 December: that were there no  annexation of Crimea, were there no dispute over Russian support for insurgents in the Donbas, Western sanctions against Russia and the new containment policy would arise nonetheless over some other issues, real or manufactured, given Russia’s open rejection of US global hegemony as opposed to global governance under universally agreed international law with full respect for the interests and security concerns of all nation-states.

Though the speech was immediately denounced in The New York Times as yet another diatribe by the Kremlin leader, Putin in fact pointedly restated his readiness to re-engage with the West at any time if his country would be treated with respect and equality. He explicitly rejected any desire to resurrect the Soviet empire, to close Russia to the world and set out on a course of autarky, to close off options in cooperation with Western Europe while undertaking the same ‘pivot to Asia’ that other world powers were concurrently implementing in recognition of Asia’s dynamism and growing importance in the world. In short, Vladimir Putin countered every charge brought to his door by the very same New York Times and other mainstream media in the West who are his detractors.

Re-reading his well-crafted Valdai speech, I believe it is the tragedy of our times that so far no leader has emerged in the West with the intelligence and the courage to take on in public space the very serious issues raised by Vladimir Putin. Official Washington in the person of State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki, or indeed in the person of President Obama himself, is offhandedly dismissive; official Europe is silent.

Annual Address to the Federal Assembly, 4 December 2014

The annual address to the Federal Assembly was delivered in the festive and historically important St George’s Hall of the Kremlin to an audience that went well beyond the two houses of the legislature which comprise the Assembly. The 1,000 in attendance include members of the federal Government, leaders of the Constitutional and Supreme Courts, the governors of the constituent territorial entities of the Federation, chairmen of their legislative assemblies, heads of the official religions and spokesmen for civil society serving in advisory bodies to the local governments. In a word, the bulk of Russia’s political class was represented in the hall.

For this reason, it is not surprising that the foreign policy portion of the speech was limited to just 4 out of the 14 pages of text even if it was presented at the outset, as the context for the domestic policy which is the central matter of such an audience’s concerns. As Martin Sieff and Dmitri Trenin have pointed out, that domestic content was substantial. President Putin set out bold plans for the reindustrialization of the country based on unleashing the entrepreneurial talents of small and medium sized businesses while stepping up state intervention in priority sectors of the economy and in support of technology. He also proposed an unqualified amnesty on repatriated assets to reverse capital outflows and curtail the offshore economy.

As for the foreign policy portion of his speech, the points presented roughly correspond to what was said in Sochi to the Valdai Discussion Club, but they were organized in different order and emphasis on the component elements differed.

To be specific, Putin opened his speech with stirring patriotic remarks and nationalist overtones. The “Crimean Spring” and the peninsula’s reunification with Russia were presented as fulfillment of a sacred mission given the civilizational importance of Crimea to the Church as the place of baptism of the 9th century founder of the Russian state, St. Vladimir.

From there, the President moved on to the origins of the confrontation with the West over the fate of Ukraine. He condemned for the n-th time the coup d’etat that overthrew in February the constitutional head of state and he ridiculed the entire posture of the European powers in the run-up to those fatal events, when they spurned Russia’s offers to negotiate over the interests at risk from the Association Agreement with the EU.

Seeing that it was playing a fool’s game, Russia then acted unilaterally to defend itself and for this it was then slapped with sanctions.  Here Putin made his point that sanctions would have been its fate in any case, because the real issue was the West’s intent to contain the now resurgent Russia. This was just the latest iteration of a centuries old pattern which had always failed in the past. Russia would have to stay the course.

And from this point, Putin went on to mention how from the 1990s Russia’s detractors in the West had been supporting terrorists, dubbed freedom fighters, in the hope that Russia would fragment, self-destruct following the Yugoslav scenario.

If any recent speech by Vladimir Putin might be said to be hostile to the West, it was clearly this Address to the Federal Assembly. The focus is on the malice of Russia’s opponents and on the nation’s strength and courage to stand tall and resist the worst sent its way. International law and openness to cooperation with all figure in the speech, but as minor motifs.

He surely knows his political elites, knows what they want to hear. And this provides us with proof, as if any were needed, that if Vladimir Putin were somehow removed from his leadership position, as so many in the US establishment hope, international relations would scarcely improve.

The patriotism and nationalism to which Putin appealed in this speech are not ends in themselves. They are the forces of attraction of the nation-state, the sole unit of measurement in the Westphalian system of global governance otherwise known as Realpolitik, of which Vladimir Putin is the consummate practitioner. In this speech, Putin managed to set out nearly all the working principles of Realism:  competing nation-states combining and re-combining to find equilibrium in a balance of power that protects the interests of all, protects each from outside interference in their internal affairs and appraises each by its foreign policy orientation not its domestic constitutional order. In every way, this worldview is at odds with the prevailing Idealism in the USA and the European Union, where only democracies can have genuinely peaceful relations with one another, where universal values dictate foreign policy and where meddling, interference in the internal affairs of other countries is the norm. Putin used the occasion to express his contempt for those in the EU who have lost their sense of national pride. In Russia’s case, there was no such option since failure to honor its distinctiveness and centralized structure would spell dissolution and destruction.

For those who say that the present confrontation between Russia and the West cannot be a new Cold War because there are no ideological differences, this evidence to the contrary is compelling. To those who insist that we live in unprecedented times, that lessons from the past have no relevance to our modern age, the only response is: read more history and less science fiction.

Are we living in 2015 or in 1618? One may be allowed to wonder. The United States and Western Europe are filling the role of the Holy Roman Empire very nicely in their pursuit of universal values, read Catholicism. The Russians are playing the part of the Protestant states in their defense of diversity and particularism. Either we come to an agreement in which the latter principles prevail or we face thermonuclear war.

Press Conference

In the nature of things, the Press Conference of 18 December was more an exercise in form than in setting out new content. After all, only the brief opening remarks were wholly under the control of the President. However, in the circumstances of impending economic crisis, form became content.

Foreign commentators expressed surprise that Vladimir Putin did not outline specific measures to combat the ongoing meltdown, while stressing his confidence in his government team. Putin did not ‘talk up’ the national currency the way an American President would at a similar juncture. Instead, his exuding confidence served to calm the nerves of his compatriots, or at least of his constituency in Middle Russia. From the very start, the broad Russian public was given explicit promises on what matters to them most: that their wages and pensions were sacrosanct and would be honored in full, together with all the social obligations written into the state budget before the crisis.

Beyond that, Putin acknowledged that economic hardship was arriving, though he put a limit of two years on its likely duration. The Western press picked up at once his mention that the economic troubles came from outside, as if this were a cover story to deflect responsibility from himself and his team for mismanagement of foreign and domestic challenges.  However, the President’s weighting of the decline of the ruble as being linked predominantly to the plunge in the global price of crude oil is accurate and irreproachable. Moreover, he explicitly rejected the notion that there was some conspiracy between the US and Saudi Arabia to bring down the price of oil so as to harm Russia. In a country which loves conspiracy theories, this was a highly responsible position to take and runs directly counter to the innuendo in Western reportage of the conference.

What commentators have also missed is Putin’s unusual frankness with his people on why the crisis presents an opportunity to achieve fundamental reorientation of the economy, namely a diversification that has eluded the leadership notwithstanding many fine words and plans in that direction over the past 15 years. The answer is very simple and may be succinctly put in American business folk wisdom as follows:  if the watch tells time, don’t fix it.  That is to say, given the high returns on investments in hydrocarbons and other primary resources since the new millennium, it was impossible to bring Russian business along on plans to invest in manufacturing industry. Putin, the free-market liberal, now was assuring his countrymen that business would respond to the new stimuli of cheap oil and gas and meet the opportunities for import replacement arising from foreign imposed sanctions and from an adverse exchange rate for importers.

The most impassioned part of his appearance at the Press Conference was precisely on foreign affairs, when he responded to a question about the anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the erection of new virtual Walls by the West, something which could be traced straight back to the early 1990s in his view. Here Putin built on his narrative dating from the Munich speech of 2007. His tone was resolute, matter of fact and confident that Russia would finally be understood.

Putin used another question as a trampoline for mention of how Russia’s openness has been spurned and elicited instead a campaign of vilification, as for example in the run-up to the Sochi Olympics.   Then he raised the image of the Russian bear, which the West wants to tie up so as to remove its claws and teeth.  This colorful allusion of course attracted US media attention.  However, few bothered to follow Putin’s further explanation of how the underlying issue was Western jealousy over Russia’s immense natural wealth and expanses.

Such comments are not coming from nowhere. They are delayed responses to real statements about Russia circulating in the West. The notion that Russia is simply too big may be found in remarks attributed to Hilary Clinton a year or two ago.  Putin’s mention of ‘vassals’ to describe America’s European allies is no doubt an allusion to Zbigniew Brzezinski’s typologies at the end of his 1997 work The Grand Chessboard.  Similarly, Vladimir Putin’s explicit offer in his Address to the Federal Assembly to cooperate with world powers in combatting Islamic terror and overcoming infectious diseases was no doubt a delayed response to Barack Obama’s speech to the United Nations General Assembly in which he insultingly listed Russia as the third major challenge facing the international community after the Islamic State and Ebola.

Just as Putin’s Russia has pledged to respond to US military threats of Star Wars technology by unconventional means of its own choosing, so the verbal assaults on Russia by US and European leaders are neither missed nor forgotten but are factored into Russian policy. Considering this, it is high time that Western leaders, and Barack Obama in the vanguard, watch their words and start behaving like statesmen rather than firebrands.

G. Doctorow is an occasional guest lecturer at St. Petersburg State University and Research Fellow of the American University in Moscow. His latest book, Stepping Out of Line: Collected (Nonconformist) Essays on Russian-American Relations, 2008-12, is available in paperback and e-book from Amazon.com and affiliated websites worldwide.

All statements in this report are an opinion of the author. Act at your own risk. Russia & America Goodwill Association (RAGA) is not responsible for the content of the article. Any views or opinions presented in this report are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of RAGA. Any liability in respect to this communication remain with the author.


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Trolling Russia - By Israel Shamir

1/20/2015

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The edifice of world post-1991 order is collapsing right now before our eyes. President Putin’s decision to give a miss to the Auschwitz pilgrimage, right after his absence in Paris at the Charlie festival, gave it the last shove. It was good clean fun to troll Russia, as long as it stayed the course. Not anymore. Russia broke the rules.

Until now, Russia, like a country bumpkin in Eton, tried to belong. It attended the gathering of the grandees where it was shunned, paid its dues to European bodies that condemned it, patiently suffered ceaseless hectoring of the great powers and irritating baiting of East European small-timers alike. But something broke down. The lad does not want to belong anymore; he picked up his stuff and went home - just when they needed him to knee in Auschwitz.


Auschwitz gathering is an annual Canossa of Western leaders where they bewail their historic failure to protect the Jews and swear their perennial obedience to them. This is a more important religious rite of our times, the One Ring to rule them all, established in 2001, when the Judeo-American empire had reached the pinnacle of its power. The Russian leader had duly attended the events. This year, they will have to do without him. Israeli ministers already have expressed their deep dissatisfaction for this was Russia’s Red Army that saved the Jews in Auschwitz, after all. Russia’s absence will turn the Holocaust memorial day into a parochial, West-only, event. Worse, Russia’s place will be taken by Ukraine, ruled by unrepentant heirs to Hitler’s Bandera.

This comes after the French ‘Charlie’ demo, also spurned by Russia. The West hinted that Russia’s sins would be forgiven, up to a point, if she joined, first the demo, and later, the planned anti-terrorist coalition, but Russia did not take the bait. This was a visible change, for previously, Russian leaders eagerly participated in joint events and voted for West-sponsored resolutions. In 2001, Putin fully supported George Bush’s War on Terrorism in the UN and on the ground. As recently as 2011, Russia agreed with sanctions against North Korea and Iran. As for coming for a demonstration, the Russians could always be relied upon. This time, the Russians did not come, except for the token presence of the foreign minister Mr. Lavrov. This indomitable successor of Mr. Nyet left the event almost immediately and went - to pray in the Russian church, in a counter-demonstration, of sorts, against Charlie. By going to the church, he declared that he is not Charlie.

For the Charlie Hebdo magazine was (and probably is) explicitly anti-Christian as well as anti-Muslim. One finds on its pages some very obnoxious cartoons offending the Virgin and Christ, as well as the pope and the Church. (They never offend Jews, somehow).

A Russian blogger who’s been exposed to this magazine for the first time, wrote on his page: I am ashamed that the bastards were dealt with by Muslims, not by Christians. This was quite a common feeling in Moscow these days. The Russians could not believe that such smut could be published and defended as a right of free speech. People planned a demo against the Charlie, but City Hall forbade it.

Remember, a few years ago, the Pussy Riot have profaned the St Saviour of Moscow like Femen did in some great European cathedrals, from Notre Dame de Paris to Strasbourg. The Russian government did not wait for vigilante justice to be meted upon the viragos, but sent them for up to two years of prison. At the same time, the Russian criminal law has been changed to include ‘sacrilege’ among ordinary crimes, by general consent. The Russians do feel about their faith more strongly than the EC rulers prescribe.

In Charlie’s France, Hollande’s regime frogmarched the unwilling people into a quite unnecessary gay marriage law, notwithstanding one-million-strong protest demonstrations by Catholics. Femen despoiling the churches were never punished; but a church warden who tried to prevent that, was heavily fined. France has a long anti-Christian tradition, usually described as “laic”, and its grand anti-Church coalition of Atheists, Huguenots and Jews coalesced in Dreyfus Affair days. 

Thus Lavrov’s escape to the church was a counter-demonstration, saying: Russia is for Christ, and Russia is not against Muslims. While the present western regime is anti-Christian and anti-Muslim, it is pro-Jewish to an extent that defies a rational explanation. France had sent thousands of soldiers and policemen to defend Jewish institutions, though this defence antagonises their neighbours. While Charlie are glorified for insulting Christians and Muslims, Dieudonné has been sent to jail (just for a day, but with great fanfare) for annoying Jews. 

Actually, Charlie Hebdo dismissed a journalist for one sentence allegedly disrespectful for Jews. This unfairness is a source of aggravation: Muslims were laughed out of court when they complained against particularly vile Charlie’s cartoons, but Jews almost always win when they go to the court against their denigrators. (Full disclosure: I was also sued by LICRA, the French Jewish body, while my French publisher was devastated by their legal attacks).

The Russians don’t comprehend the Western infatuation with Jews, for Russian Jews have been well assimilated and integrated in general society. The narrative of Holocaust is not popular in Russia for one simple reason: so many Russians from every ethnic background lost their lives in the war, that there is no reason to single out Jews as supreme victims. Millions died at the siege of Leningrad; Belarus lost a quarter of its population. More importantly, Russians feel no guilt regarding Jews: they treated them fairly and saved them from the Nazis. For them, the Holocaust is a Western narrative, as foreign as JeSuisCharlie. With drifting of Russia out of Western consensus, there is no reason to maintain it.

This does not mean the Jews are discriminated against. The Jews of Russia are doing very well, thank you, without Holocaust worship: they occupy the highest positions in the Forbes list of Russia’s rich, with a combined capital of $122 billion, while all rich ethnic Russians own only $165 billion, according to the Jewish-owned source.  Jews run the most celebrated media shows in prime time on the state TV; they publish newspapers; they have full and unlimited access to Putin and his ministers; they usually have their way when they want to get a plot of land for their communal purposes. And anti-Semitic propaganda is punishable by law – like anti-Christian or anti-Muslim abuse, but even more severely. Still, it is impossible to imagine a Russian journalist getting sack like CNN anchor Jim Clancy or BBC’s Tim Willcox for upsetting a Jew or speaking against Israel.

Russia preserves its plurality, diversity and freedom of opinion. The pro-Western Russian media – Novaya Gazeta of oligarch Lebedev, the owner of the British newspaper Independent – carries the JeSuis slogan and speaks of the Holocaust, as well as demands to restore Crimea to the Ukraine. But the vast majority of Russians do support their President, and his civilizational choice. He expressed it when he went to midnight Christmas mass in a small village church in far-away province, together with orphans and refugees from the Ukraine. And he expressed it by refusing to go to Auschwitz.

Neither willingly nor easily did Russia break ranks. Putin tried to take Western baiting in his stride: be it Olympic games, Syria confrontation, gender politics, Georgian border, even Crimea-related sanctions. The open economic warfare was a game-changer. Russia felt attacked by falling oil prices, by rouble trouble, by credit downgrading. These developments are considered an act of hostility, rather than the result of “the hidden hand of the market”.

Russians love conspiracia, as James Bond used to say. They do not believe in chance, coincidence nor natural occurrences, and are likely to consider a falling meteorite or an earthquake - a result of hostile American action, let alone a fall in the rouble/dollar exchange rate. They could be right, too, though it is hard to prove.

Regarding oil price fall, the jury is out. Some say this action by Saudis is aimed at American fracking companies, or alternatively it’s a Saudi-American plot against Russia. However, the price of oil is not formed by supply-demand, but by financial instruments, futures and derivatives. This virtual demand-and-supply is much bigger than the real one. When hedge funds stopped to buy oil futures, price downturn became unavoidable, but were the funds directed by politicians, or did they act so as Quantitative Easing ended?

The steep fall of the rouble could be connected to oil price downturn, but not necessarily so. The rouble is not involved in oil price forming. It could be an action by a very big financial institution. Soros broke the back of British pound in 1991; Korean won, Thai bath and Malaysian ringgit suffered similar fate in 1998. In each case, the attacked country lost about 40% of its GDP. It is possible that Russia was attacked by financial weapons directed from New York.

The European punitive sanctions forbade long-term cheap credit to Russian companies. The Russian state does not need loans, but Russian companies do. Combination of these factors put a squeeze on Russian pockets. The rating agencies kept downgrading Russian rating to almost junk level, for political reasons, I was told. As they were deprived of credit, state companies began to hoard dollars to pay later their debts, and they refrained from converting their huge profits to roubles, as they did until now. The rouble fell drastically, probably much lower than it had to.

This is not pinpoint sanctions aimed at Putin’s friends. This is a full-blown war. If the initiators expected Russians to be mad at Putin, they miscalculated. The Russian public is angry with the American organisers of the economical warfare, not with its own government. The pro-Western opposition tried to demonstrate against Putin, but very few people joined them.

Ordinary Russians kept a stiff upper lip. They did not notice the sanctions until the rouble staggered, and even then they shopped like mad rather than protested. In the face of shrinking money, they did not buy salt and sugar, as their grandparents would have. Their battle cry against hogging was “Do not take more than two Lexus cars per family, leave something for others!”

Perhaps, the invisible financiers went too far. Instead of being cowed, the Russians are preparing for a real long war, as they and their ancestors have historically fought – and won. It is not like they have a choice: though Americans insist Russia should join their War-on-Terrorism-II, they do not intend to relinquish sanctions.

The Russians do not know how to deal with a financial attack. Without capital restrictions, Russia will be cleaned out. Russian Central bank and Treasury people are strict monetarists, capital restrictions are anathema for them. Putin, being a liberal himself, apparently trusts them. Capital flight has taken huge proportions. Unless Russia uses the measures successfully tried by Mohammad Mahathir of Malaysia, it will continue. At present, however, we do not see sign of change.

This could be the incentive for Putin to advance in Ukraine. If the Russians do not know how to shuffle futures and derivatives, they are expert in armour movements and tank battles. Kiev regime is also spoiling for a fight, apparently pushed by the American neocons. It is possible that the US will get more than what it bargained for in the Ukraine.

One can be certain that Russians will not support the Middle Eastern crusade of NATO, as this military action was prepared at the Charlie demo in Paris. It is far from clear who killed the cartoonists, but Paris and Washington  intend to use it for reigniting war in the Middle East. This time, Russia will be in opposition, and probably will use it as an opportunity to change the uncomfortable standoff in the Ukraine. Thus supporters of peace in the Middle East have a good reason to back Russia.

Israel Shamir works in Moscow and Jaffa
- He can be reached on adam@israelshamir.net
- Language editing Ken Freeland

Article published with permission of Israel Shamir
Article originally published on: http://www.unz.com/ishamir/trolling-russia

We welcome your comments and encourage open discussion. 

All statements in this report are an opinion of the author. Act at your own risk. Russia & America Goodwill Association (RAGA) is not responsible for the content of the article. Any views or opinions presented in this report are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of RAGA. Any liability in respect to this communication remain with the author.

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FALLING OIL - WILL PRICES RISE & What's Really Happening?   

1/7/2015

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In this video Dmitry Tamoikin, CEO of ESDC, talks about the falling price of oil, why is it doing so and what will happen with oil in the future. Dmitry believes that not only there is market manipulation at play but a larger strategy that is being executed.

Click here to read Dmitry's article:
STRONG DOLLAR, CHEAP OIL – FREE MARKET OR MANIPULATION?

We welcome your comments and encourage open discussion. 

All statements in this report are an opinion of the author. Act at your own risk. Russia & America Goodwill Association (RAGA) is not responsible for the content of the article. Any views or opinions presented in this report are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of RAGA. Any liability in respect to this communication remain with the author.

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